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**IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION: A MISSING COMPONENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY AND POLICY**

by

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March 2010

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**IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION: A MISSING COMPONENT OF HOMELAND
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ABSTRACT

This thesis will add to emerging discussion in this country on immigrant integration and tie this issue to national security. Long after the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) processes their paperwork, many immigrants may be left struggling with the issue of identity. Some may resolve these issues and become thoroughly integrated Americans who weave their own cultural traditions into an American way of life. Others might question, for example, whether their sense of duty as a Muslim outweighs their sense of duty as an American, especially when the United States is conducting the “War on Terror” in two Muslim countries simultaneously while American television highlights any mistreatment of Muslims by U.S. soldiers (e.g., Abu Ghraib). It is this latter group that may be most vulnerable to radicalization. An immigrant integration strategy that provides a pathway for immigrants to invest themselves in American society makes sense from a policy perspective, if the end result is a feeling of pride and belonging that would make attacking the United States similar to harming one’s own self. This thesis offers a comparative study of the Dutch and Canadian integration models, which reflect vastly different policies. Both offer lessons learned and possible strategy attributes for U.S. policymakers’ consideration.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

1. The Problem

The United States currently has no formal, comprehensive immigrant integration policy in place. It is only relatively recently, under the George W. Bush Administration, that the concept of immigrant integration has been discussed and studied by policymakers. However, in spite of the 2008 Presidential Task Force recommendations, which specifically address integration, no concrete strategy has been formulated to address this issue. There is no evidence that the Task Force either considered the integration programs of other countries or considered security concerns in formulating its recommendations to the former President.

The reason that this issue must be addressed can be highlighted by the recent attention called to the recruitment and radicalization of Somali youth in the Twin Cities area. As many as 20 young Somali immigrants disappeared from the Twin Cities area and turned up with the radical Islamist terrorist group, Al-Shabaab (an offshoot of Al Qaeda), in Somalia. There is no question that their recruitment and radicalization took place in the United States (U.S. Senate, 2009). Although it was determined in subsequent investigations that these youth had no plan to attack the United States directly, there exists the very real possibility that in the future, those radicalized in the United States and trained abroad might be used in a domestic attack. This recent example serves to demonstrate the connection between immigrant integration issues, radicalization, and resulting terrorist activity and highlights the current gap and pressing need to address this issue on a national level. Immigrant integration is a pressing national security issue.

United States immigration programs grant permanent immigration benefits without ensuring that those receiving the benefits integrate into American society. In many ways, getting a college diploma and a naturalization certificate reflecting U.S. citizenship are similar because while both hold the possibility of opening doors to a better

life, they are in fact just pieces of paper. While they are important pieces of paper that impart rights and perhaps a certain social acceptance, it is what one chooses to do with his or her new immigration status reflected on those papers that can be life changing. With a “Green Card” or naturalization certificate in hand, new residents and citizens are then expected to integrate on their own. However expected it might be, neither new residents nor citizens are required to participate in American society. Just as receiving a college diploma does not mean that one is going to do a good job in the workplace, a Green Card or naturalization certificate does not mean one will be an upstanding resident or citizen or even “feel” American. While most workplaces have training programs that introduce new employees to the workplace and teach the skills needed to succeed in a new position, there is no such program to introduce new immigrants into American society. There is a need for a comprehensive national strategy to facilitate the integration of new residents and citizens into American society, not only to bind citizens together as a more cohesive nation, but also because a national integration strategy may assist in minimizing domestic terrorism.

2. Status Quo

The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is the federal agency that grants immigration benefits. An “immigrant” is any person who seeks to stay permanently in the United States. There are several types of permanent immigration benefits, such as refugee status, asylum status, legal permanent residence, and citizenship through naturalization (see Table 1).

Table 1. Immigration Benefits and Requirements

Immigration Benefit	Language Requirement	Civics Education Requirement	Indefinite status
Refugee Status	No	No	No, must apply for permanent residence after 1 year
Asylum Status	No	No	Yes

Immigration Benefit	Language Requirement	Civics Education Requirement	Indefinite status
Adjustment of Status (Permanent Residence)	No	No	Yes
Naturalization	Yes	Yes	Yes

Refugees are overseas, unable to leave their homeland in spite of persecution or fear thereof, and are interviewed by USCIS Officers abroad and then resettled to the United States on a permanent basis (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), n.d.a). Asylees are immigrants who arrive in the United States, generally in flight from persecution, and receive a permanent grant of asylum because they are unable to return home without fear of harm (USCIS, n.d.a). Permanent residents, or Green Card holders, receive lawful permanent residence which is generally obtained through employment or family relationships (USCIS, n.d.b). Recipients of these first three benefit types are not required to speak English or pass any kind of civics knowledge examination. These applicants simply meet or do not meet the legal criteria to acquire the status. Asylees, who have the right to live, work, and go to school in the U.S. indefinitely, need never upgrade their status to legal permanent resident. Although refugees must apply to upgrade to legal permanent residents within one year of entry into the U.S., they need never apply for citizenship. If one does become a legal permanent resident, he or she may receive from USCIS a booklet entitled *Welcome to the United States: A Guide for New Immigrants*, which contains information on such things as when it is appropriate to call 911 (USCIS, 2007a). A legal permanent resident need never upgrade their status to citizen. Only those permanent residents seeking to become naturalized citizens must take basic English and civics tests in addition to meeting legal criteria. Even then, there are exceptions that allow for a waiver of these tests. Aside from the *Guide* and the naturalization tests, there is no formal program in place to integrate new permanent residents or citizens into American society apart from limited short-term assistance available from the Department of Health and Human Services to beneficiaries of USCIS humanitarian programs, asylees, and refugees (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.).

According to the U.S. Census Bureau's 2008 American Community Survey, as of December 2008, 12.5 percent of the total population of the United States is composed of immigrants (Terrazas & Batlova, 2009). In 2007, nearly 1.1 million new legal permanent residents joined the U.S. population in 2007, and the U.S. naturalized more than 660,000 new citizens (Terrazas & Batlova, 2009). In 2008, the U.S. again admitted 1.1 million persons as legal permanent residents and naturalized a record number of new citizens, more than one million (U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2009). These are significant numbers, and it is anticipated that these numbers will continue to grow.

3. Issue Identified, but No Plan in Place

There are voices in the private and non-governmental spheres that recognize an evident gap in immigration policy, as Tomas Jimenez, a Stanford sociology professor and prolific writer on integration and assimilation notes:

The federal government has not paid much attention to immigrant integration in recent history. Any policies related to immigration have dealt almost exclusively with who should be allowed in, who can stay and who should go. When it comes to integration, the policy has been one of no policy. (2009)

Though it is true that there is no policy, some efforts have been made by the U.S. Office of Citizenship, a component of USCIS, to further its mission to "provide federal leadership, tools, and resources to proactively foster immigrant integration" (USCIS, n.d.c). Recent initiatives by this office evidence a shift towards an integration effort and include the launch of new citizenship test in 2008, which is written to make the test less about rote memorization and more meaningful (in actuality very similar to the previous) and the publication of civics education study materials in multiple languages (USCIS, n.d.d). While these initiatives are a start, they fall short of the comprehensive regime needed to truly sponsor an integrative environment.

Despite the lack of an official program, USCIS has given more attention to the issue of immigrant integration. The *USCIS Strategic Plan 2008–2012* outlines six goals; the third of which is to "support immigrants' integration and participation in American civic culture" (USCIS, 2007b). The *Strategy* notes:

There is a lack of consensus on the ideal U.S. citizenship characteristics. USCIS recognizes that a sound integration program, based on our common civic principles and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, is a cornerstone that could limit the potential of marginalization, “balkanization,” and possible radicalization of segments of immigrant populations.” (USCIS, 2007b, p. 10)

The *Strategy* contains only a couple of suggestions as to how to do this, stating that, in order to further this goal, USCIS will make civics educational material available and attempt to make naturalization ceremonies meaningful and significant. These efforts, though valiant, appear small if immigrant integration is a serious “cornerstone” goal. Nevertheless, under the new Obama administration, this issue appeared to gain more prominence when the recently appointed USCIS Director, Alejandro Mayorkas, established the Office of Public Engagement in September 2009. According to the Director, “The Office will be focused on community engagement, intergovernmental affairs, and protocol. The Office’s focus will be on the open, candid, and constructive collaboration with our community stakeholders at all levels” (USCIS Broadcast, 2009). While the purpose of this office is not to design an integration program, its establishment may further the national dialogue on integration as customers and local communities communicate their needs to USCIS. On February 25, 2010, Director Mayorkas announced the availability of two different grants designed to help prepare Green Card holders for citizenship (USCIS, 2010). The first grant will strengthen locally-based citizenship service providers. The second grant will increase the capacity of members or affiliates of national, regional, or statewide organizations to offer citizenship services in underserved communities (USCIS, 2010). While these grants have yet to be awarded, they are a significant first step forward towards a government sponsored immigrant integration program.

The previous administration studied and highlighted the need to integrate new immigrants, but no concrete strategy emerged from this effort. On June 7, 2006, President George W. Bush created the Task Force on New Americans by Executive Order. The Task Force, chaired by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “brought together a wide variety of federal agencies to strengthen the efforts of federal,

state, and local agencies to help legal immigrants embrace the common core of American civic culture, learn our common language, and fully become Americans (DHS, 2008a, p. viii). Not directly associated with USCIS, the accessible, tangible result of the findings of the Task Force on New Americans is the Web site www.welcometousa.com. The Web site aims to be “the primary gateway for new immigrants to find basic information on how to settle in the United States. The Web site seeks to improve access to federal government information on the Internet by consolidating information into helpful categories and highlight new resources available to immigrants and the organizations that serve them” (Welcome to USA.gov, n.d.). Unfortunately, the lack of a distinct connection between this Web site and USCIS, the federal agency tasked with adjudicating immigration benefits, means that many, if not most, of those employed by USCIS are not even aware of the existence of this tool and therefore do not refer new immigrants to this resource.

The Task Force published a set of recommendations in December 2008 that may serve as a starting point in the conversation about developing and implementing a comprehensive national strategy. Unfortunately, the Task Force disbanded upon publication of the recommendations, few of which were actually implemented. There is no evidence to indicate that the work of the Task Force continues under the current presidential administration. Although the Task Force served to bring the issue of immigrant integration to light, there is no indication that the Task Force studied or considered the failures or successes of other countries, considered national security, or counterterrorism benefits in formulating their recommendations to President Bush.

4. Background

The United States government does little to integrate new immigrants into American society, either before or after it grants them permanent immigration benefits. Given the shifting demographics of the United States population, recent attempted domestic terror attacks committed by legal permanent residents and naturalized citizens, the fact that the United States is engaged in two land wars as well as “The War on Terror” (a term dropped by the Obama Administration and replaced with Overseas

Contingency Operation) and the contentious nature of the immigration debate, it is necessary that the United States formulate and implement a strategy for immigrant integration in order to simultaneously bind citizens together as a nation and to minimize the risk of domestic terrorism committed by immigrants.

The U.S. government should take the lead in addressing immigrant integration because it is responsible for granting legal immigration status to aliens who meet the proper legal qualifications for such benefits. In addition to meeting legal criteria for permanent residence and citizenship, should not the U.S., as a society, to the best of the ability as a nation and a people, ensure that new residents and citizens understand American history, value the U.S. way of life, and wish to safeguard the United States as their new and chosen homeland? Immigrants, at the end of their encounter with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the federal agency which grants permanent immigration status, may come away with a new Green Card or certificate of citizenship, but they may not immediately identify as “American” or feel that they belong. Although they may have gained the right to legally work, attend school, live in the United States indefinitely, or even vote, immigrant populations do not shed their cultural identities upon receiving an immigration status from a U.S. government agency; nor should they. Nevertheless, from a security standpoint, it stands to reason that those who live here, in addition to loyalties to their native cultures, should also relate to and identify as Americans as well, or at a minimum, not harbor and pursue terrorism against the system and society that granted them admission. This research paper proposes the formation of a national comprehensive immigrant integration program to address these issues.

American culture is still influenced by the concept of rugged individualism, where making it on one’s own is a source of pride. This concept of self-sufficiency, which implies little or no government assistance, is a part of United States history and of a shared American cultural norm. The concept was popularized by presidential candidate Herbert Hoover in a 1928 campaign speech in the midst of the Great Depression. Americans expect immigrants to abide by the same cultural norms and values and to do so immediately. This may be an unrealistic expectation given the variety of cultures and backgrounds from which immigrants come to the U.S.

Long after USCIS processes their paperwork, many immigrants may be left struggling with the issue of identity. Some may resolve these issues on their own and become thoroughly integrated Americans who weave their own cultural traditions into an American way of life. However, others might question, for example, whether their sense of duty as a Muslim outweighs their sense of duty as an American, especially in a time where the United States is conducting the “War on Terror” in two Muslim countries simultaneously while American television highlights the mistreatment of Muslims by U.S. soldiers, such as the Abu Ghraib scandal. It is this latter group that may be most vulnerable to radicalization. An immigrant integration strategy that encourages and provides a pathway for immigrants to invest themselves in American society simply makes sense from a policy perspective if the end result is a sense of pride and belonging that would make attacking the United States similar to harming one’s own self.

Evidence indicates that radicalization can and does take place among immigrants who may be struggling with identity issues. Since 2005, there have been several thwarted attacks in and on the United States perpetrated by immigrants given permanent immigration status by the U.S. government. The perpetrators of these unsuccessful attacks include the “The Miami Seven,” “The Fort Dix Six,” the JFK plotters, as well as groups from Torrance, California, from Toledo, Ohio, and from Atlanta, Georgia. While homegrown terrorists could conceivably attack the United States in the name of any cause, all six of the incidents above involve Muslim men and appear to be religiously motivated. While it is clear that the United States has been the subject of planned and executed attacks by native-born citizens, some also religiously motivated. The statements made by the immigrant men involved in the thwarted attacks listed above indicate that they shared a similar motivation. The pattern that emerges is that of Muslim men who feel they are defending their faith against the United States, a perceived aggressor. Clearly, these individuals identified more with their religion than their nationality or country of residence. It is as if these plotters feel that the U.S. has betrayed them. This information could be valuable in planning an immigrant integration strategy, especially since it appears that the U.S. will be involved militarily in the Middle East for some time to come, which could be interpreted by some as an attack on Islam.

While a need to address immigrant integration exists, there will be challenges to both the design and implementation of such a program. Regardless of the structure and requirements of such a program, since it will be different than the status quo, advocacy groups may assert an underlying racist intent and attempt to thwart any major changes in how the government grants immigration benefits. However, since any program will apply equally to all immigrants and require the cooperation of the American people, this obstacle can be overcome. The biggest obstacle may be that of monetary cost. Who would foot the bill for an immigrant integration program? U.S. taxpayers may not wish to pay for a program; the effects of which may be immeasurable. How can one measure a more cohesive society, and, if this is possible, could it be attributed in a measurable proportion to one factor over another? How can one count terrorist attacks that simply never take place? The cost of such a program can in part be borne by those who utilize it; however, the cost of not addressing immigrant integration in the United States will have exorbitant costs in the foreseeable future, possibly in the form of future domestic attacks, which, unlike those since September 2001, may not be thwarted.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

This thesis will add to emerging discussion in this country on immigrant integration and tie this issue to national security. Although immigrant integration has recently been addressed by the Task Force on New Americans, which set forth recommendations to former President Bush in 2008, no nexus to national security has been provided as a basis for anticipated change. This thesis will explore the national security element of this discussion that has received less attention but is still critical to any proposed new program. It will also look specifically at the immigration programs of two countries that have included integration elements and evaluate their failures and successes. A comparative analysis of international programs already in place will allow a more thorough understanding of which elements should be included in a U.S. program.

C. RESEARCH QUESTION

Based on a review of the immigrant integration programs of other countries, what lessons can policymakers learn and apply when formulating an immigrant integration strategy for the United States?

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature informing this research may be divided into the following categories: current information on the state of U.S. immigration programs and integration initiatives, examples of the domestic terrorist threat (in the form of news reports, law enforcement reports, and trial transcripts), an academic study of the process of radicalization and identity, and comparative literature outlining the strategies of other countries with established integration programs. In its entirety, this literature provides the information and insight needed to establish the nature and magnitude of the domestic radicalization threat; the role the U.S. government has played in the immigration context to grow, impede, or ignore the threat; and models of policies and strategies, the study of which may prove useful in the formulation of U.S. policy.

The research question above is really two questions, both of which are currently unanswered by academic literature. Immigration has always been and likely will continue to be a contentious and politically charged issue. In the United States, the granting of immigration benefits falls exclusively to the federal government, and specifically to USCIS, an agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It is important to remember that USCIS is a new agency, born from the division of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 2003 when DHS was established (USCIS, n.d.e). For USCIS, homeland security is a newer lens through which to view the granting of immigration benefits. Within five years of its formation, USCIS has recognized the need for an immigrant integration program, as evidenced by its mention in the USCIS *Strategy* but has none in place. If limiting the potential for radicalization of segments of immigrant populations is the endgame of an integration strategy, the literature review must naturally lead to an understanding of who is vulnerable to radicalization and a study of the radicalization process.

1. Domestic Radicalization

The United States has been the subject of several attempted “homegrown” attacks committed by groups including naturalized citizens and residents. Outlining the immigration status of the attackers illustrates the fact that most are legal permanent residents or naturalized citizens. This section strives simply to provide a factual background and context as to why this research question is worth pursuing.

Although the United States has been attacked by native-born citizens, each of the thwarted domestic terror attacks used in support of the stated research question includes plotters who were either legal permanent residents or naturalized citizens. Sources outlining the immigration status of the attackers and their motivations come from media reports, law enforcement reports and press releases. More specifically, the sources of this information include, for example, a Department of Justice press release, an article from the *Washington Times*, a transcript of a radio show on National Public Radio, and articles from CNN and MSNBC.

While homegrown terrorists could conceivably attack the United States in the name of any cause, all six of the incidents outlined in the domestic radicalization case studies reviewed in this thesis involve Muslim men and appear to be, in part, religiously motivated. Clearly, these individuals identified more with their religion than their nationality or country of residence. Based on the above data, there seems to be a connection between homegrown terrorism and Muslims in the United States. Yet, none of the individuals involved in the thwarted attacks were “planted” in the U.S. to facilitate or carry out such attacks. They already lived here and then decided to attack their home country, or, in the case of the Toledo terrorists, U.S. soldiers abroad. What crisis of identity caused these men to attempt attacks on their chosen country of residence? Perhaps the key to understanding this issue is the words of the terrorist themselves. The words of the terrorists are pulled from media reports, law enforcement reports, and trial transcripts in this section, and they serve to highlight the motivation behind the attempted attacks. More specifically, the sources that quoted the terrorists’ explanations of their

reasons for planning or attempting attacks against the United States include CNN, *San Francisco Gate*, BBC, Fox News, and *Time Magazine*.

In spite of these homegrown attempted attacks, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* of September 2006 focuses almost exclusively on the transnational Islamic terrorist threat, the “principal enemy” (White House). However, it briefly acknowledges the homegrown threat by stating, “We will continue to guard against the emergence of homegrown terrorists within our own Homeland as well” (White House, 2006, p. 10). The question, left unanswered by the *National Strategy*, is simply, how should this be done? Looking at the immigration status of the homegrown plotters detailed in this section and their own words as to motivation leads to the conclusion that the risk that the U.S. takes of not integrating its new immigrants into society is that eventually one or more attempted homegrown attacks will be successful. It will be apparent then that the U.S. will have not taken any or enough preventative measures to counteract domestic radicalization.

2. Radicalization Process and Identity

The literature on this issue that has relevance to the overarching research questions above involves the process of radicalization, and, more specifically within that process, the search for an identity. Another theme explored in this literature is whether there is a way to halt the radicalization process if the right type of intervention were to take place.

The City of New York Police Department (NYPD) published a report in 2007 entitled *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (hereinafter NYPD report) in which the writers sought to understand the radicalization process of Muslims in the U.S. and Europe (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 8). Though the report does not differentiate between the various immigration statuses of Muslims living in the West, its findings offer insights that could be built upon in planning an integration strategy. For example, the report states that, “the transformation of a Western-based individual to a terrorist is...because *the individual is looking for an identity* [emphasis added] and a cause and unfortunately, often finds them in the extremist Islam” (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 8). If

some individuals are seeking their identity in extremist Islam, perhaps an effective counterterrorism strategy would entail giving those who are new immigrants, along with their immigration status, an assist in establishing an American identity that they can then mesh with their own cultural beliefs and backgrounds.

The NYPD report found that the radicalization process is composed of four distinct phases: pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 19). This analytical framework led the NYPD to shift their focus from the point at which terrorists begin attack planning to a much earlier point at which the radicalization process occurs (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 85). The NYPD closes by framing the issue without answering the questions behind it:

The challenge to intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the West in general, and the United States in particular, is how to identify, pre-empt and thus prevent homegrown terrorist attacks given the non-criminal element of its indicators, the high growth rate of the process that underpins it and the increasing numbers of its citizens that are exposed to it. (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 85)

That is indeed the challenge, but it is not solely a law enforcement or intelligence issue. The real challenge is to prevent radicalization in the first place, which one could argue is a societal issue and an issue that may be partially addressed through an immigrant integration program.

Another report on radicalization published by the National Defense Research Institute calls the radicalization process the “Life-Cycle Process of Individual Terrorists.” It notes that the 9/11 terrorists were the product of a relatively lengthy process, which started out as dissatisfaction with one thing or another, not for economic deprivation or lack of educational opportunities (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 19). Next, they were influenced by peers or Muslim scholars, given small tasks to do, admitted to the organization, sent to training, indoctrinated, bonded with similar individuals, and then “reassimilated” into the society they were to attack upon receiving orders (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 19). This study finds:

There are numerous places where it is possible to intervene...there are many opportunities for action, including tighter monitoring of émigrés and

visitors, cooperation with foreign governments to obtain more information about the individuals, and truly integrated databases among organs of government. (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 20)

The literature on radicalization and the search for an identity will provide a substantive background for understanding which “trigger” factors may ultimately culminate in violent acts that could possibly be mitigated, at least in part, through integration efforts.

3. Comparison to Other Countries

The United States is not alone in its large immigrant population. Several other countries with robust immigration programs have also experienced difficulty with integration, while others have successfully integrated their immigrant populations. Their failures and successes should be studied and understood prior to making recommendations either for or against a U.S. program.

While many countries have addressed immigrant integration, this research project focuses on two programs that define opposite ends of the spectrum. The Dutch model and the Canadian model reflect vastly different integration policies and both offer lessons learned and possible strategy attributes for U.S. policymakers’ consideration.

a. Netherlands

The Netherlands may be one of the most progressive countries worldwide in immigrant integration, seeking to integrate both newcomers both before and after arrival. Under the Civic Integration Abroad Act of 2006, individuals wishing to immigrate to the Netherlands must have some knowledge of Dutch, take an integration exam prior to arrival, and participate in a civic integration program after arrival (Ambassade van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, n.d.). The Dutch program is mandatory in nature and non-compliance is penalized. The literature on the Dutch civic integration program consists of government Web sites, academic articles, news articles, and a large volume of critical essays, including position papers from Human Rights Watch, which assert that the Dutch program is discriminatory and calls for its suspension.

b. Canada

Canada has a federal immigrant integration strategy that is deeply rooted in multiculturalism, a concept codified in Canadian law. Canada now manages a comprehensive settlement, adaptation, and integration program. Canada manages integration by providing federal funds to a variety of stakeholders, such as provincial, private sector, educational, and local partners who in turn deliver integration services such as language classes, translation, and community orientations. The Canadian program is voluntary in nature and attempts to provide an atmosphere conducive to integration rather than mandating it occur within a set timeframe. The literature on the Canadian program consists of government publications, scholarly articles, and books.

4. Current Landscape

In summation, the literature reviewed informs that there is no immigrant integration policy in the United States, that USCIS has identified a need to formulate an immigrant integration strategy, that domestic terrorist attacks have been attempted by immigrants, and that other countries have attempted to address this issue through the implementation of integration policies and strategies, in part, administered by their immigration services. What is not known, and the ultimate outcome of this research project, is what such a strategy might look like in the United States given American culture, U.S. immigration history, and ever-shifting demographics.

E. METHODOLOGY AND CASE SELECTION

This research project employs a comparative case study method. The analysis of the failures and successes of the integration policies of the Netherlands and Canada should be instructive to policymakers who will likely create some sort of U.S. integration program given the recommendations set forth by the Task Force for New Americans in December 2008.

The Dutch integration model was selected for comparative analysis to current U.S. policies because it is widely recognized as one of the most demanding in the world

as related to requirements placed upon the intending immigrant in the name of civic integration. Due to its position on the far end of the spectrum, the Dutch model has garnered much criticism and therefore offers a wealth of literature which provides a studied contrast to how little attention the current U.S. efforts, or lack thereof, have received until fairly recently. Additionally, the Netherlands offers a roughly comparable legal system (civil law), political system (though a constitutional monarchy, containing executive, legislative, and judicial branches), and operational threat environment (fear of actual attacks by Islamic extremists).

The Canadian integration model was selected for comparative analysis to current U.S. policies because it has been in place, in some form, for decades, and continues to evolve as Canada places more and more emphasis on immigrant integration. Furthermore, as primarily a voluntary program, it provides excellent contrast to the Dutch program, which is mandatory in nature. Moreover, like the Dutch program, Canada's integration program has been attention of both national and international critique, offering a wide base of literature for study and analysis. In many ways, one could assert that the Canadian program is on the opposite end of the spectrum from the Dutch program. Offering two such diverse perspectives gives much for U.S. policymakers to consider when constructing a U.S. program. While the Dutch program may offer an insight into a larger European perspective on immigration and integration, Canada perhaps offers a North American perspective, and is indeed worth studying due to geographical proximity. Additionally, Canada offers a roughly comparable legal system (based in British common law) and political system (although parliamentary, based in a constitution).

F. OVERVIEW OF REMAINING THESIS CHAPTERS

This first chapter has provided an introduction to the topic, has established the methodological framework for the current research, and has provided a review of the salient literature. The next chapter will discuss the concept of a crisis of identity that may lead an individual to radicalize and explore ways in which the process of radicalization may be halted prior to violent activity. Chapter III provides an analysis of the first case

study, the Dutch civic integration model, and Chapter IV covers the second case study, the Canadian “newcomer” integration model. Chapter V provides an overview and critique of the most developed policy recommendations on immigrant integration drafted by the Task Force on New Americans. The final chapter provides a synthesis and ends with recommendations for a United States Immigrant Integration Program.

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II. RADICALIZATION AND IDENTITY

A. BACKGROUND/CONTEXT

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide a definition of integration. The DHS-sponsored Task Force on New Americans uses the term “assimilation” to refer to the process of embracing shared political principles, which exemplifies democratic traditions and builds a sense of community and common identity as Americans (DHS, 2008a). It also uses the term “Americanization” as the process of integration by which immigrants become a part of U.S. communities and by which U.S. communities and the nation learn from and adapt to their presence (DHS, 2008a, pp. ii, viii). According to one dictionary definition, integration is “incorporation as equals into society or an organization of individuals of different groups” (Merriam-Webster Online, 2010).

Granting a person legal immigration status does not necessarily “incorporate” that person into society, and it is precisely this lack of incorporation that might lead some to identify with dangerous individuals or groups rather than American society at large. If the U.S. desires immigrants to become “American,” larger cultural questions emerge, such as, what binds Americans as a people? What is it that makes an American? Certainly, the history of the United States demonstrates that it is not race or religion, and it is certainly more than nationality. Although the essence of what makes an individual quintessentially American may be indefinable, one defining principle is Americans’ willingness to accept others, especially immigrants. Ellis Island is a universally recognized symbol and the point through which more than 12 million immigrants passed between 1892 and 1924 (Ellis Island Foundation, n.d.). Unfortunately, there are periods in U.S. history in which Americans have not demonstrated tolerance or acceptance towards others perceived as different on the basis of, for example, ethnicity or religion. In fact, the first immigration law, passed in 1882, was the Chinese Exclusion Act. (An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to the Chinese, 1882). Although public attitudes about immigration have waxed and waned since before the first immigration law

was enacted in 1882, the United States has never stopped accepting new immigrants and, if current trends continue, it appears unlikely that it will ever stop. However, times have changed since 1882, and so must the U.S. immigration strategy change from mere acceptance of new immigrants to planned integration.

B. THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS

Although immigrants who have had their applications for status processed by USCIS may gain the right to legally work, attend school, live in the United States indefinitely, or even vote, immigrant populations do not shed their previous cultural identities upon receiving an immigration status from a U.S. government agency. One scholar who studies national identity and immigrant integration in Canada, the United States, and France, describes the American identity, “The United States tends to be characterized as a classically liberal or Lockean state, marked by commitments to individualism, freedom from government, equality of opportunity, confidence in markets, and participatory democracy” (Harles, 2008, pp. 3–4). Is there an innate understanding that doing things on one’s own is better and needing assistance connotes weakness? As an immigrant receiving country, does the American populace place its own cultural expectations upon those who do not share this innate understanding of what is expected? The U.S. expects immigrants to make their own way, to fit in, and to do so expeditiously.

This may be an unrealistic expectation given the variety of cultures and backgrounds from which immigrants come. Many, some of whom may come from more communal or tribal cultures, may feel lost after arrival and seek others with whom to identify. Long after USCIS processes their paperwork, many immigrants may be left struggling with the issue of identity. Some may resolve these issues on their own and become thoroughly integrated Americans blend their own cultural traditions into their new lives in America. However, others might question, for example, whether their sense of duty as a Muslim outweighs their sense of duty as an American, and it is this latter group which may be most vulnerable to radicalization.

The process of radicalization can be described as the search for an identity. The overarching academic question is whether or not there is a way to halt the radicalization

process if the right type of intervention were to take place at an early stage prior to violent activity. An immigrant integration strategy might serve such a purpose.

The United States has been the subject of several attempted “homegrown” attacks committed by groups of individuals composed of both naturalized citizens and residents. Table 2 below outlines the immigration status of the attackers, and illustrates the fact that most of the individuals involved in these acts are legal permanent residents or naturalized citizens.

Table 2. Immigration Status of “Homegrown” Terrorists

Attempted attack/arrest/conviction date	Location	Immigration Status of Attackers	Motivation
Attack thwarted June 2, 2007 (Kobach, 2007).	JFK airport in New York (Kobach, 2007)	The four JFK terrorists include two nationals of Guyana, one of Trinidad, and one former Guyanan who was granted U.S. citizenship (Kobach, 2007).	Muslim extremists. Hatred of the U.S. and Israel
Attack thwarted in May 2007. Convicted December 22, 2008 (Zielbauer & Hurdle, 2008).	Fort Dix in New Jersey (Temple-Raston, 2008).	The Fort Dix Islamic terrorists included five foreign nationals from Yugoslavia and Jordan. Two had Green Cards (permanent residence). A sixth, from Turkey, eventually obtained U.S. citizenship. Three were illegal aliens who snuck across the southern border years ago near Brownsville, Texas (Temple-Raston, 2008).	Muslim extremists. Intended to assault the Army base and slaughter U.S. soldiers

Attempted attack/arrest/conviction date	Location	Immigration Status of Attackers	Motivation
Attack prevented, individuals arrested June 22, 2006, five convicted May 12, 2009 (A.P., 2009).	Miami arrests, Miami (FBI building) and Chicago (Sears Tower) targets (NBC news, 2006).	The seven Miami terrorists include five U.S. citizens (four U.S. born and one naturalized), one legal immigrant from Haiti and one illegal immigrant from Haiti (NBC news, 2006).	To wage war against America. Had taken an oath to Al Qaeda. Self described as “Black Muslims” (NBC news, 2006).
Indicted in March/April 2006 (Department of Justice [DOJ], 2008), one man convicted June 10, 2009 (DOJ, 2008), the other convicted August 12, 2009 (DOJ, 2009)	Atlanta-based, targets included Washington D.C.	One man, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan, was a student at Georgia Tech. The other, a U.S. citizen of Bangladeshi descent, was born in Virginia (DOJ, 2009).	Muslim extremism
Indicted February 21, 2006, convicted June 13, 2008 (Reiter, 2008)	Toledo, Ohio, targets U.S. soldiers in the Middle East	One man is a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Jordan. Another, born in the U.S., also holds Jordanian citizenship. A third, a permanent resident, came to the U.S. from Lebanon in 2000 and was an engineering student at the University of Ohio (Reiter, 2008)	Muslim extremists who wished to kill U.S. troops in the Middle East (Reiter, 2008)
Indicted August 2005 (DOJ, 2005), convicted December 2007	Torrance, CA. Targets were military bases in Southern California	One man is a lawful permanent resident from Pakistan, and other three were born in the United States (DOJ, 2005).	Muslim extremism

Each of the representative examples of thwarted domestic terror attacks outlined above involved plotters who were either legal permanent residents or naturalized U.S. citizens. While homegrown terrorists could conceivably attack the United States in the name of any cause, all six of these incidents involve Muslim men and appear to be religiously motivated. What is it about Islam that trumps the fact that these men chose to live in the United States? Perhaps one key to understanding this issue are the words of the terrorist themselves.

In one conversation taped by the FBI, Defreitas (the lead plotter of the thwarted attack at JFK airport in New York), allegedly discusses an incident he says motivated him to strike JFK. He claimed that while working at JFK, he saw military parts being shipped to Israel, including missiles, that he felt would be used to kill Muslims. He “wanted to do something to get those bastards” (CNN, 2007). In another recorded conversation with his conspirators in May 2007, Defreitas compared the plot to attack JFK airport with the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center, saying, “Even the Twin Towers can't touch it. This can destroy the economy of America for some time” (CNN, 2007).

Other terrorists expressed similar intentions when interviewed. For example, the ringleader of the “Miami Seven” asked an undercover agent he thought was from al-Qaeda for help to build an “army to wage jihad” (BBC, 2006). He also said that he and his “soldiers” wanted al-Qaeda training and planning for a “full ground war” against the U.S. in order to “kill all the devils we can,” stating that his mission would “be just as good or greater than 9/11” (BBC, 2006). With similar sentiments, one Toledo, Ohio terrorist stated, “Killing Americans in Iraq is OK” (Milicia, 2008). Another terrorist, the Torrance, California plotter, who founded his own terrorist group in prison, wrote, “This incident is the first in a series of incidents to come in a plight to defend and propagate traditional Islam in its purity. We are not extremists, radicals or terrorists. We are only servants of Allah” (Associated Press, 2007).

The picture or pattern that emerges from these statements is that of Muslim immigrant men who feel they are defending their faith against the United States, a perceived aggressor. This information could be valuable in planning an immigrant

integration strategy, especially since it appears that the U.S. will be involved militarily in the Middle East for some time to come. These actions could be interpreted by some as an attack on Islam. Since each of these plotters gained a permanent immigration benefit from the U.S. government, is there a point at which their pathway to terrorism could have been altered, and if so, could the U.S. government play a role in halting the radicalization process in susceptible individuals by sponsoring an integration program? More specifically, could an immigrant integration program serve as a counter tactic to domestic radicalization?

Despite these homegrown attempted attacks, the U.S. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* of 2006, a document formulated under the Bush Administration (and remains the current strategy under the Obama Administration), focuses almost exclusively on the transnational Islamic terrorist threat as the “principal enemy” (White House, 2006). However, it briefly acknowledges the homegrown threat by stating:

Democracies are not immune to terrorism. In some democracies, some ethnic or religious groups are unable or unwilling to grasp the benefits of freedom otherwise available in the society. Such groups can evidence the same alienation and despair that the transnational terrorists exploit in undemocratic states. This accounts for the emergence in democratic societies of homegrown terrorists—even among second- and third-generation citizens. Even in these cases, the long-term solution remains deepening the reach of democracy so that all citizens enjoy its benefits. *We will continue to guard against the emergence of homegrown terrorists within our own Homeland as well* [emphasis added]. (White House, 2006, p. 10)

One unanswered question in the *National Strategy* is how is the U.S. guarding against this emergence now? Looking at the immigration status of the homegrown plotters detailed in the above case studies and their own words as to motivation leads to the conclusion that the risk that the U.S. takes by not integrating new immigrants into society is that eventually one or more attempted homegrown attacks will be successful and, and the country will not have taken any preventative measures to counteract domestic radicalization.

The process of radicalization has been studied not only by scholars but also by law enforcement agencies, which needed to recognize the signs of radicalization in their day-to-day work so as to better combat its progression. To this end, the NYPD (2007) published the *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*, in which the writers sought to understand the radicalization process of Muslims in the U.S. and Europe (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 8). Though the report does not differentiate between the various immigration statuses of Muslims living in the West, its findings offer insights that could be built upon in planning an integration strategy. For example, the report states:

Much different from the Israeli-Palestinian equation, the transformation of a Western-based individual to a terrorist is not triggered by oppression, suffering, revenge, or desperation. Rather, it is a phenomenon that occurs because *the individual is looking for an identity* [emphasis added] and a cause and unfortunately, often finds them in the extremist Islam. Despite the economic opportunities in the United States, the powerful gravitational pull of individuals' religious roots and identity sometimes supersedes the assimilating nature of American society, which includes pursuit of a professional career, financial stability and material comforts. (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 8)

If some individuals are seeking their identity in extremist Islam, perhaps one aspect of an effective counterterrorism strategy would entail giving those who are new immigrants, along with their immigration status, an American identity that they can then mesh with their own cultural beliefs and backgrounds.

The NYPD report found that the radicalization process is composed of four distinct phases: pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 19). This analytical framework led the NYPD to shift their focus from the point at which terrorists begin attack planning to a much earlier point at which the radicalization process occurs (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 85). The NYPD closes by framing the issue without answering the questions behind it:

The challenge to intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the West in general, and the United States in particular, is how to identify, pre-empt and thus prevent homegrown terrorist attacks given the non-criminal element of its indicators, the high growth rate of the process that underpins it and the increasing numbers of its citizens that are exposed to it. (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 85)

That is indeed the challenge, but it is not solely a law enforcement or intelligence issue. The real challenge is to identify and prevent radicalization in the first place which is a societal issue and one that may be partially addressed through an immigrant integration program.

The National Defense Research Institute calls the radicalization process the “Life-Cycle Process of Individual Terrorists,” noting that the 9/11 terrorists were the product of a relatively lengthy process, which started out as dissatisfaction, not for economic deprivation or lack of educational opportunities (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 19). Next, they were influenced by peers or Muslim scholars, given small tasks to do, admitted to the organization, sent to training, indoctrinated, bonded with similar individuals, and then “reassimilated” into the society they were to attack, awaiting orders (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 19). This study finds that “there are numerous places where it is possible to intervene...there are many opportunities for action, including tighter monitoring of émigrés and visitors, cooperation with foreign governments to obtain more information about the individuals, and truly integrated databases among organs of government” (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 20). These studies do seem to indicate that radicalization can be tackled through early intervention. One such method may involve reaching out to those immigrants who are struggling in a new country and culture and attempting to integrate them into U.S. society.

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Center for Terrorism Research, released in April 2009 a new report on homegrown terrorists entitled *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K., An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process* (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009). Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman sought to empirically “study the process through which these terrorists are radicalizing,” in part by “relying wherever possible on their own words” (2009, p. 11). They concluded that there are six manifestation of the radicalization process that can be observed in homegrown terrorists:

- adopting a legalistic interpretation of Islam
- trusting only select religious authorities

- a perceived schism between Islam and the West
- low tolerance for perceived theological deviance
- attempts to impose religious beliefs on others, and
- political radicalization. (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, pp. 11–13)

Noted subject matter expert and Senior Advisor to the President of the RAND Corporation, Brian Michael Jenkins, stated of this study:

The researchers asked how the terrorists got there, and they discovered clusters of indicators that recur sufficiently to suggest a shared trajectory of radicalization. Radicalization is a prerequisite to terrorism—there are no moderate bombers—but radicalization does not automatically and inexorably propel one all the way to violence. As previous studies have shown, and the authors of this research would agree, some individuals start down the path of radicalization, then they halt or abandon the process before they are recruited into violence. It would be useful to know why. (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, p. 8)

This study, an examination of the process through which terrorists are radicalizing, highlights several themes that revolve around the search for an identity and torn loyalties. The findings concluded:

As homegrown terrorists radicalize, they often come to perceive an inherent schism between Islam and the West...frequently the concept of loyalty is critical...the idea that the individual has obligations to Islam alone, and cannot have any kind of duty or loyalty to a non-Muslim state. Frequently, political radicalization begins when an individual learns about injustices inflicted upon Muslims in a far-flung corner of the world. (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, pp. 13, 53)

This insight is reflected in the words of the Fort Dix terrorists. One Fort Dix plotter stated, “In the end, when it comes to defending your religion, when someone...attacks your religion, your way of life, then you go jihad” (Parry, 2007). Another stated, “My intent is to hit a heavy concentration of soldiers” (Parry, 2007). And yet a third stated, “It doesn't matter to me whether I get locked up, arrested or get taken away. Or I die, it doesn't matter. I'm doing it in the name of Allah” (Parry, 2007). These individuals were inspired by Al Qaeda (Parry, 2007). The indictment of the Atlanta

plotters stated that their motivation to attack targets inside in the United States was “defense of Muslims or retaliation for acts committed against Muslims” (Dell’orto, 2006). Both groups evidently believed that their religion was under attack and that they were obligated to defend it.

The study concludes that civic engagement may be the most important countermeasure to domestic radicalization, noting that “Attempts to promote civic engagement by the Muslim community are not just beneficial for reasons of integration and social cohesion, but such efforts may also play an important role in addressing the threat of homegrown terrorism” (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, p. 19). This acknowledgement of the need to reach out to “key communities” was echoed by former Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, who testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that “an effective strategy to prevent and counter domestic radicalization requires that we not only engage these communities, but also take proactive steps to build trust and respond to issues of concern to Americans of different ethnicities, cultures, and faiths” (Chertoff, 2007, p. 2).

Perhaps the most recent and striking reminder of the need to engage communities in their own backyards occurred when as many as 20 young Somali youth disappeared from the Twin Cities area and turned up with the radical Islamist terrorist group, Al-Shabaab (an offshoot of Al Qaeda), in Somalia. On March 11, 2009, the Senate’s Homeland Security Committee held hearings into these disappearances and the possible radicalization of Somali youth. Federal counterterrorism officials told the committee that the recruitment represents a potential security threat to the United States. If recruits were to be indoctrinated abroad and later returned to America, they could “provide al-Qaida with trained extremists inside the United States,” said Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence in the National Counterterrorism Centre of the Directorate of Intelligence (The Guardian, 2009). Although there is no evidence that the disappeared youth were focused on harming the U.S., there is no question that their radicalization took place in the United States.

If U.S. immigration programs worked in concert with community organizations to encourage the development of an identity that is inclusive of both obligations to an

alien's culture and to the United States, it might have a chilling effect on the radicalization process and decrease homegrown attacks.

In 2007, the Pew Research Center published a report entitled *Muslim Americans, Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream*, which presented findings from a comprehensive nationwide survey of Muslim Americans. This study presents some enlightening findings regarding the concept of identity and divided loyalties. Forty-three percent of those surveyed say that Muslim immigrants arriving in the U.S. should mostly adopt American customs and ways of life, while 26 percent think that new immigrants should try to remain distinct (Pew Research Center [Pew], 2007). Only 16 percent of those surveyed thought that both were possible simultaneously (Pew, 2007, p. 29). More telling, perhaps, is the fact that 47 percent of those surveyed think of themselves as Muslim "first," while only 28 percent think of themselves as American "first" (Pew, 2007, p. 29).

These eye-opening statistics indicate that there is not only room for, but also a need for, a middle ground. A successful integration program must respect native cultures, customs, and religions and at the same time encourage the development of an American identity, such that new immigrants do not feel that being American and Muslim, or any other religion, is a conflict that requires the taking of sides. A U.S.-born female doctoral student of Islamic studies at Georgetown University, who is a practicing Muslim and chooses to wear a headscarf, summed up the issue well in a recent *Newsweek* article:

...Obama's decision to visit a Muslim country within the first 100 days of his presidency was such a significant moment for me. Hearing his unwavering, unapologetic message to the Turkish Parliament filled me with pride: yes, he told the world, Muslim Americans exist, and our existence has enriched—not impoverished—American culture. His words mirrored what I have long sought to convey to other Americans: that you can be both a devout Muslim and a patriotic American. I can only hope my fellow citizens get the message. *When many Americans see Muslims like me, they tend to define us as something non-American, which forces us to choose between our religion and nationality* [emphasis added]. By insisting that America's relationship to Muslims across the globe 'will not just be based upon opposition to terrorism,' Obama has made me feel that there is a place for my identity within America's. (Mubarak, 2009)

If someone born and raised in the U.S. struggles with the search for identity that reconcile both her faith and loyalty to her country, imagine the increased stress and pressure placed upon those new to this country who have no ties to the United States except for a piece of paper granting them permanent immigration status.

Dr. Fathali Moghaddam, a professor in Georgetown University's Department of Psychology, asserts that it is most useful to view identity as "dynamic and in flux" as persons evolve in and within a cultural context (2006, p. 14). He explains:

Individuals incorporate and assimilate into their identities those aspects of the world that make their lives more meaningful and fulfilled. People continually change themselves, as they shed and take on, subtract and add and reevaluate aspects of identity. They do not simply 'show anger,' 'feel shame,' and 'demonstrate aggression,' but they become angry, shamed, and aggressive persons. Their view of the sort of persons they are, and not just what they do, changes continually. Some individuals become terrorist, taking on the morality of terrorism as part of their personal identity. *Becoming a terrorist is more than just taking part in terrorist activities; it is transforming the self to arrive at a particular identity* [emphasis added]. (Moghaddam, 2006, p. 15)

The common theme echoed above is that radicalization is a pathway with many steps, which may ultimately culminate in violence justified by a particular ideology. One does not become a violent terrorist in a day. The studies outlined above share common findings: that the possibility of intervention exists, that the pathway can be altered, that the trajectory can be redirected, and that the momentum towards violence can be halted. The key to success in this endeavor is in redefining the identity of the would-be terrorist, at the earliest stage possible, and definitely prior to violent action. Central to this idea of intervention is the concept of engagement at some level, whether on a community or individual level.

C. IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

If there is a point in the process of radicalization where prevention or intervention is possible, perhaps the U.S. should seek to integrate immigrants seeking to identify with something larger than themselves into U.S. society through immigration programs and, therefore, lower risk of terrorist attacks to the homeland. This piece of the

counterterrorism puzzle is currently missing. Statistics from the Department of Homeland Security indicate that for the 2007 fiscal year, 660,477 individuals became naturalized citizens, and 1,052,415 became legal permanent residents, while 73,487 were admitted as refugees and asylees (DHS, 2008b). These numbers, which only account for the two largest permanent immigration programs, were much higher in fiscal year 2008. In 2008, USCIS naturalized 1,046,539 persons, a record number, admitted 1,107,126 for permanent residency, and 83,008 as refugees and asylees (DHS, 2009). Although a monumental task, considering the spate of recently planned and thwarted terrorist attacks planned in large part by immigrants and the increasing numbers of those who are seeking to immigrate to the United States, the idea of institutionalizing an immigrant integration program may be worth further analysis. In order to better understand what elements should be incorporated into a comprehensive program, the failures and successes of other countries should be analyzed, as there are many countries which have decades of experience with formal integration. The following two chapters present the integration programs administered by the Netherlands and Canada, two countries that view immigrant integration as a national priority but follow divergent approaches in policy and implementation.

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III. NETHERLANDS CASE STUDY

A. THE DUTCH CIVIC INTEGRATION MODEL

Within the Ministry of Justice, “the Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst (IND) is responsible for the immigration policy in the Netherlands” (Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst [IND], n.d.a). The agency responsible for integration policy is the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment (Ministrie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer [VROM] (VROM, n.d.a). The IND implements, through its immigration programs, the integration policies created by VROM. According to VROM:

Integration is a term often used to denotate the co-operation and co-existence of various ethnic groups within society. Approximately ten per cent of the Dutch population belongs to an ethnic minority. The aim of our integration policy is to create a society where everybody actively and fully participates and where people are all treated the same way. Equal treatment is an important principle of our integration policy.

[The] integration program for newcomers in the Netherlands means that immigrants who come to live in this country for a longer period (more than 3 months) speak the language, [and] are familiar with aspects of the Dutch society, including important norms and values. The government of the Netherlands considers the integration program as a condition of integration. Requirements regarding the integration program are codified in the Act on Integration. (VROM, n.d.b)

The Netherlands currently has several pieces of legislation in effect concurrently which govern immigration and integration laws and policies:

- Civic Integration Act Abroad or Wet inburgering in het buitenland [WIB] (2006-presently in effect)
- Civic Integration Act (2007-presently in effect) (Wet inburgering or WI)
- Delta Plan for Civic Integration (2007-undetermined). (VROM, 2008a, p. 3)

For purposes of comparative analysis, the following section will focus on the current laws in place in the Netherlands and the requirements they place upon immigrants.

B. CURRENT DUTCH LAW AND POLICIES GOVERNING INTEGRATION

The Civic Integration Act Abroad (Wet inburgering in het buitenland [WIB]) entered into force on March 15, 2006 (Management Summary, n.d.). It was the first program anywhere in the world that required intending immigrants to pass integration examinations as *a condition to arrival in the country* of destination, and, for this reason, it was upon enactment, and continues to be, quite controversial (“Dutch News,” 2007).

According to VROM, the goals of the WIB are quicker and better integration in the Netherlands by starting the process abroad; enhancing individual awareness of what it takes to migrate; demanding a basic knowledge of Dutch language, society, and values; the result of which is a self-selection of immigrants who are motivated to succeed and integrate as evidenced by their successful passage of an exam in their home country (VROM, 2008a, p. 9). The Dutch government has asserted that the ultimate goal of the integration process, which the WIB facilitates, is the application for full citizenship in the Netherlands. Citizenship means “an individual can build a self-sufficient life, in freedom, and that he or she adheres to basic Dutch norms” (Musso-van der Velde, 2004, p. 2).

Since the WIB has only been in effect for three years, there are no long-term data to indicate that passage of a pre-departure exam results in the self-selection of an immigrant group that succeeds at in-country integration after arrival. Furthermore, those subject to the WIB have not yet had enough time to become citizens, the stated criteria for success at integration. However, what the WIB did do, for the first time, is signal a movement from the existence of a voluntary integration program to one that was required and placed the focus of responsibility for integration on the immigrant. This means that although the government regulates the examination, the training necessary to pass the test is not state-controlled and is paid for by the prospective immigrant (Musso-van der Velde, 2004, p. 2).

The WIB exam itself is two-part, consisting of “Knowledge of Dutch Society” and “Knowledge of Dutch Language” portions and is taken at the Dutch embassy in the intending immigrant’s country of origin (VROM, 2008a, p. 12). Those required to take the exam are persons between the ages of 16–65 who wish to come to the Netherlands for a non-temporary purpose, all settled non-naturalized migrants (who are obviously already in the Netherlands), and “spiritual counselors” coming to work, even if they do not intend to stay longterm (VROM, 2008a, p. 7). For the most part, these requirements appear to apply mostly to those seeking to join a family member in the Netherlands and spiritual leaders.

Each portion of the test takes 15 minutes. At the embassy, the test taker is examined in Dutch over a telephone line which is attached to a computer, and he or she is expected to answer correctly the questions asked by the computer (Dutch Consulate of New Zealand, Frequently Asked Questions [FAQ], n.d.). The computer provides results immediately, and if successful, the test taker can then apply for an immigrant visa (FAQ, n.d.). The cost for the test is 350 Euros and is borne by the alien who is also responsible for getting him or herself prepared for the examination (FAQ, n.d.). The Dutch language portion of the exam consists of repeating sentences, answering questions, and giving brief accounts of stories (IND, n.d.b). On March 15, 2008, the grading system for the spoken Dutch portion of the test changed, requiring a higher score than previously needed to pass (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2008).

While language testing is not unusual in the context of naturalization, it is unheard of as a requirement for initial visa issuance. However, the most creative requirement of the WIB is the “Knowledge of Dutch Society” portion of the examination. In drafting the WIB, the Dutch Cabinet made it clear that it is important that anyone who wishes to stay in the Netherlands permanently must “be aware of Dutch values” (FAQ, n.d.). Dutch officials call the Netherlands “one of the world’s most permissive societies,” and insist that they want “all applicants to wonder whether they would fit in” (Crouch, 2006). The test involves watching a two-hour film at home called *To the Netherlands* about life in the Netherlands and then, utilizing the same telephone line as used in the language testing, answering questions about the film on such subjects as democracy, the geography

and history of the Netherlands, Dutch institutions, education, healthcare, employment, and the economy (Besselink, 2008, p. 5). The film involves two controversial scenes, one involving two men kissing and another involving a topless woman at the beach (Bransten, 2006). Critics have asserted that these scenes were inserted to deliberately insult and exclude devout Muslims (Bransten, 2006). However, these particular scenes have been edited out of the film in countries where such images are illegal, which include Muslim countries like Iran (Hansen, 2008, p. 10). The Chairman of Emcemo, a Moroccan interest group in Amsterdam, said:

The film is just another example of how the Netherlands are trying to limit immigration from Muslim countries. This isn't education, it's provocation. The new law (WIB) has one goal: to stop the flow of immigrants, especially by Muslims from countries like Morocco and Turkey. (Crouch, 2006)

VROM asserts that the goals of the Knowledge of Dutch Society portion of the exam are not for the immigrant to learn dry factual knowledge but to expose him or her to facts about the Netherlands, for the immigrant to demonstrate that he or she is able to look for and find important information, and that he or she knows the legal framework and how to function within that framework (VROM, 2008a, p. 22). The legality of the WIB requirements will be explored further below; however, it should be noted that even if an alien abroad passes these tests and receives a visa to travel to the Netherlands for the purpose of a long-term stay (also called a temporary residence permit or *Machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf* (MVV), he or she will be subject to further integration testing after arrival.

On January 1, 2007, the Civic Integration Act (*Wet inburgering* [WI]) entered into force (Besselink, 2008, p. 5). Both the WI and the WIB, discussed earlier, currently remain in effect. The WI replaces the Civic Integration Newcomers Act (*Wet inburgering nieuwkomers* [WIN]), enacted in 1998, and in effect, makes the integration process mandatory by setting time limits for passing examinations and establishing fines and consequences for failure and non-compliance (Besselink, 2008, p. 6). The WI test includes “a practical exam during which candidates are tested whether in practice they can communicate sufficiently, and a central exam which is partly a language test, partly a

knowledge of Dutch society, and finally a set of questions on practical situations” (Besslink, 2008, p. 6). Persons who took the WIB abroad ,in order to receive a visa to travel to the Netherlands must, after arrival, also pass the WI within three and a half years, while those who did not take the test abroad (because they arrived pre-WIB) must pass within five years (Bessalink, 2008, p. 6). The consequences for failure to take the test in the time prescribed include fines of 250 to 1000 Euros and the inability to obtain permanent resident status (Bessalink, 2008, p. 6).

IND decided to phase out the test which was in place for naturalization and to replace it with the WIB examinations described above (IND, n.d.c). Generally, in most immigration schemes, naturalization, which is the aquisition of citizenship, occurs after one has been a permanent resident for a specified number of years and requires the passage of a naturalization examination. As of October 1, 2007, there is no naturalization test at all, but one must pass the WIB prior to applying for naturalization (IND, n.d.c).

C. CRITIQUE OF DUTCH CIVIC INTEGRATION PROGRAMS

The primary criticism of the Dutch integration requirements is that they are discriminatory in nature (HRW, 2008, pp. 22, 26). Several categories of persons are exempt from taking the WIB (IND, n.d.c). The largest category includes foreign nationals from the following countries who do not need visas to travel to the Netherlands:

Australia, Canada, Japan, Monaco, New Zealand, South Korea, the United States of America, Vatican City, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, or the United Kingdom. (HRW, 2008, p. 15)

The Dutch government emphasizes that everyone who requires an MVV (visa) must take the WIB, and, therefore, they assert, by linking their integration abroad examination to visa issuance, the WIB requirements are applied evenhandedly to all (HRW, 2008, p. 16). While citizens of countries of the European Union and European Economic Area do not require visas by operation of law, when asked why some non-

EU/EEA countries were also exempt the MVV requirements, such as Japan and South Korea, the Dutch government asserted that the exemptions made sense because the countries in question are similar to the Netherlands in socio-economic and political development. However, Human Rights Watch notes that the government provided no evidence on how the level of a country's development affects the ability, inclinations, or willingness of a potential individual migrant to integrate in the Netherlands (HRW, 2008, p. 16).

Other exempt categories of persons include au pairs, students, employment immigrants, and family members of someone who has asylum status are not required to take the civic integration examination abroad. Exemptions may also be granted on medical grounds (IND, n.d.d).

Although exempt from the examination abroad (WIB), once arrived in the Netherlands, the integration requirements are the same for all (i.e., the WI) (Musso-van der Velde, 2004, p. 6). However, it is the examination abroad, the WIB, which some feel serve as a screening mechanism designed to exclude certain groups of immigrants. The Europe and Central Asia Director at Human Rights Watch stated:

The overseas integration test is discriminatory because it explicitly applies only to relatives from predominantly non-western countries. These measures keep families apart and appear to be aimed at keeping certain kinds of people out of the Netherlands. It sends the message that certain groups are not welcome and it risks alienating those communities instead of facilitating their integration. (Human Rights Watch, 2008)

According to another source:

The test has had as its main effect that the number of applications for visa for long-term stay in the Netherlands has been reduced dramatically. Whereas in 2004 the number of applications was 29, 000, in 2006 (the year the WIB went into effect) it went down to 14, 500. In the first nine months of 2007 the number went up, but not so significantly that it would bring numbers up anywhere near those of 2004 or 2005. The fact that most candidates (87%) who take the test pass at first attempt combined with the announced raising of the pass/fail threshold (referring to the higher score required on the Dutch language portion of the test since May 2008) without increasing the level of required knowledge, may be taken to suggest that the test has not significantly contributed to preparing

candidates in a meaningful way for their full integration and participation in Dutch society. This reinforces that conclusion that inburgering (integration) is not a social measure but a migration law instrument with as a consequence and principal effect in practice the exclusion of aliens. (Besselink, 2008, p. 5)

The Islamic community in the Netherlands appears to be disproportionately impacted by the WIB. Statistics gathered by the Dutch government do indeed indicate that “Moroccans and Turks showed the biggest fall in the number of applications” (Management summary, n.d., p. 5). Human Rights Watch, in a 45-page paper to the Dutch government, stated:

the overseas integration test in force since 2006—raises the greatest human rights concerns...the overseas integration test applies only to national of some countries wishing to join family members or spouses in the Netherlands...in practice, the overseas integration test targets would-be family migrants from the countries of origin of two of the three largest migrant communities in the Netherlands—Moroccans and Turks—as government documents published when the draft measure was presented to Parliament make clear. (HRW, 2008, p. 2)

While these requirements also apply to the immigrant family members and spouses of Dutch citizens, the impact is again hardest on the Turk and Moroccan communities because they rarely marry persons outside of their ethnic group and indeed, many opponents believe that this requirement was enacted in part to stem the flow of imported brides (HRW, 2008. pp. 2, 8).

When the WIB legislation was introduced into Parliament in 2004, the Dutch government assessed that almost half of all immigrants in the past years consisted of people joining family members in the Netherlands, including through marriage, and noted:

...a significant portion of this group of migrants has characteristics that are unfavorable for adequate integration in Dutch society. The most prominent of these—also in size—is the group of family formers from Turkey and Morocco...Almost half of the family migrants come from Morocco and Turkey. These migrants have a poor starting position in Dutch society, have little contact with Dutch people, identify mainly with their own group, and orient themselves mainly to their own language and culture. (Netherlands Parliament, 2004, p. 4)

In a memo from the Social and Cultural Planning Office, the government notes:

Women from ethnic minority groups have considerably lower level of education than native Dutch women. Of the Turkish women between 40 and 65 years of age, a maximum of 80 percent have had basic education, whereas this is true for not less than 90 percent of the older Moroccan women. They have a very low rate of participation in the labor market...A quarter of them have jobs, and about 15 percent of the women on average are jobless as against 4 percent of the native Dutch women. (HRW, 2008, p. 18)

Such statistics would make it clear that passing an integration examination abroad in order to reunite with a family member in the Netherlands would be difficult at best. In an interesting legal ruling, in July 2008, the Amsterdam district court found that it was unlawful to require an illiterate Moroccan woman wishing to join relatives in the Netherlands to pass the integration test before being allowed in the country. The court's decision was based on a technicality and did not actually address the applicant's argument that the test is discriminatory (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Although human rights organizations have called for the Dutch government to suspend the WIB, this has not been done, and it remains a requirement even while under official review (Human Rights Watch, 2008).

D. POLITICAL CONTEXT

There are often political reasons underlying laws that, in practice, have uneven impact while purporting to be evenhanded. Here, a rise in Islamist violence appears to have been one impetus for the WIB legislation and may help explain why the WIB, as enacted, indirectly impacts Muslim populations. Certainly the 9/11 attacks in the United States called attention worldwide to Islamic extremism. The European Union Committee on Migration noted, "11 September has affected the public opinion's perception of foreigners and national and religious minorities, especially those issued from immigration, who are now often seen as a potential threat to national security and to fundamental values of host societies" (Cocodia, 2003, p. 98). With the stage set by 9/11, broad media attention was then drawn to the following events in the Netherlands:

- In 2003, after being reprimanded for improper behavior by a Dutchman, a young Moroccan kicked the Dutchman to death.
- In 2003, a group of North African youth in Amsterdam kicked a homeless woman to death.
- In 2004, a Turkish youth shot his teacher to death.
- During this time period, an imam labeled homosexuals as inferior; in a radical mosque, books were found which called on all people to kill homosexuals; an imam refused to shake hands with Rita Verdonk, then Minister for Aliens' Affairs and Integration, because she is a woman (note that Minister Verdonk was instrumental in drafting the WIB).
- In 2004, filmmaker Theo Van Gogh was murdered by a Dutch-Moroccan youth who was affiliated with a radical Islamist network in the Netherlands. (Bruquetas-Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Pennix, & Scholten, n.d., pp. 19, 20)

Van Gogh was murdered because his film *Submission*, about the role of women in Islam, was seen as insulting to the religion (Pennix, 2005, p. 9). Dutch Immigration Minister Rita Verdonk turned the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh into an integration issue, stating on the evening of the murder that “[failed integration] has gone this far, and it goes no further” (Assimilation Policies, 2006). Taken cumulatively, these events also may explain the inclusion of the film *To the Netherlands*, which features two men kissing, in the Knowledge of Dutch Society portion of the WIB, as well as the requirement that “spiritual counselors” (such as imams) take the WIB, even if they do not intend to stay for the long-term in the Netherlands. In many ways, then, one might view the WIB as a pre-emptive anti-radicalization measure. The Netherlands’ Deputy National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, testifying on the Dutch experience in front of the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in June 2007, stated, “One way we work to prevent radicalization is by intensifying our efforts to integrate Muslims into Dutch society” (Ongering, 2007, p. 7). It appears then, that the Dutch model has intertwined immigration and integration by mandating examinations in an attempt to prevent Islamic radicalization.

E. ANALYSIS

How effective is the Dutch model at requiring true integration? The WIB requirements appear to have enflamed the very groups that the Dutch government wished to integrate, Muslims from Morocco and Turkey. While social cohesion is the overarching goal of integration, the Dutch government refers statistically to those who are “western” and “non-western” (Statistics Netherlands, 2008), language which appears exclusive rather than inclusive in nature. While nationals of other EU/EEA countries are exempt from WIB requirements because they do not require visas, it is the exemption of those who are not EU/EEA nationals (such as Japanese nationals) that makes the opponents’ case. The WIB does appear discriminatory in application. As Besselink notes, “there appears to be something of an inconsistency somewhere” (2008, p. 9). He further states:

...there are exceptions, the Japanese, the Americans, the Swiss—not the kind of nationals who are generally reputed to have a great ability to learn foreign languages and to adapt immediately to the particularities of a foreign country like the Netherlands...here we begin to surmise that there is a hidden rationale behind the integration requirements. Might it be that these groups, although not integrated very well at all in terms of language and cultural integration into Dutch society, simply do not create any major problems and we (the Dutch) like to remain friends with them as they bring a profit to the economy? (Besselink, 2008, p. 10)

Pennix notes, “the consequence is that such a policy polarizes, sustains and increases the divide between natives and immigrants, feeding distrust rather than the trust among immigrants that is needed to speed up integration processes of admitted immigrants” (2005, p. 11).

Clearly, requiring different standards for those of different nationalities is not an effective integration strategy and has served to rile up those whom the Dutch most wanted to integrate. The Dutch government itself has decided that “the level of integration is currently disappointing” and the Cabinet approved a new “Civic Integration Delta Plan” to supplement the WIB and WI requirements (European Commission, 2006, p. 143). In fact, the WIB has had the effect of limiting immigration, which the Dutch

government has stated is not the goal of the act (VROM, 2008, p. 9). Now the Delta Plan has been set in motion, in part, it appears, to correct this consequence.

The Delta Plan, which was initially expected to be in place by 2011, was supposed to be implemented by the local Dutch community in which the immigrant chooses to settle. It focuses on tailoring integration to each immigrant's special needs, such as extra language classes or vocational training (VROM, n.d.c). This development has interesting implications for a U.S. model. Despite a highly regimented federally administered integration program, the development of the Delta Plan appears to indicate that integration actually occurs on the local level.

Unfortunately, there is very little concrete information available about the Delta Plan, and in fact, it appears that it may have lost momentum. The Dutch House of Representatives Web site on the "Integration Master Plan" states:

The key elements of the integration policy remain the emphasis on each person's own responsibility, the legal obligation to become integrated, and the punishment of non-compliance with legal obligations. Over the past few years a lot of effort was put into the development of new legislation (the Delta Plan) but the Cabinet now focuses on the effective implementation of the existing law. (The Dutch House of Representatives, n.d.)

Instead of the Delta Plan, the Cabinet wishes to develop "dual integration programs" that combine traditional integration requirements, such as the testing described above, with education, work, or social participation in the resident's local municipality. Details on implementation are lacking, although the stated goal is that at least 80 percent of all integration will follow the dual program track by 2011 (The Dutch House of Representatives, n.d.). It appears that the Dutch have attempted to implement several integration plans over the years, each more restrictive, and have currently settled on the inclusion of a new piece, exploring integration at the local level.

F. LESSONS LEARNED

1. Equal Application

There are lessons to be learned from the Dutch model, especially in what not to do. A U.S. program that had disproportionate impact on particular immigrant groups would never be tolerated, especially since the pro-immigrant, non-governmental, advocacy community is so vocal and influential. Furthermore, the U.S. is renowned for its immigrant roots, and maintains a proud reputation as a “melting pot.” Any U.S. integration program must be evenhanded in application. The requirements written therein should apply to all immigrants, regardless of their country of origin, without the blanket exemptions for nationals of some countries that backfired on the Netherlands and resulted in enraging the very Muslim population the Netherlands most wanted to integrate. No one population should be targeted, directly or indirectly, by integration policies.

2. Language Acquisition

The Dutch were the first to require language acquisition as a prerequisite to initial visa issuance, and this served to separate families and to limit immigration, further fanning the flames of segregation. Family reunification is the backbone of U.S. immigration policy and placing pre-travel language/culture restrictions on prospective immigrants would likely not fit into the traditional view of family reunification. However, the U.S. model, which only requires language acquisition at the naturalization/citizenship stage, enables those who wish to avoid learning English to do so indefinitely if they wish to remain in permanent resident status. Therefore, those who have no desire to become citizens have no incentive to learn English apart from personal motivations. Yet, extensive research in North America has confirmed that in a service-based economy in which the majority of new jobs are created in non-industrial sectors, mastery of the national language is key to economic success (Hansen, 2008, p. 16).

Perhaps the U.S. should consider requiring language acquisition prior to the citizenship stage, as Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands do at the permanent residency stage. These language tests have had a measurably positive impact on

language acquisition (Hansen, 2008, p. 17). While it is true that the United States has never declared an official language, English remains the de facto official language because it is the most widely spoken (U.S. Census, 2000). Furthermore, English is the only designated language required for the acquisition of U.S. citizenship. Though all evidence points toward high levels of English language acquisition over time, those who cannot speak English suffer from diminished earning power, have a tougher time being involved in their children's lives, and cannot fully participate in life in the United States (Jimenez, 2009). The U.S. currently requires language testing take place at a citizenship interview. While it may appear burdensome to require that this testing take place at the legal permanent resident stage, it might positively impact integration efforts and expand employment possibilities for new immigrants sooner than if not required.

3. Immigrant Responsibility

While the Dutch model has garnered much criticism for its extreme stance, it has succeeded in shifting the focus of responsibility for integration from the government to the immigrant, framing integration as a civic duty for those who wish to join the Dutch people in a permanent manner. There is a sense of accomplishment and pride that can be won from taking responsibility for one's own integration. These sentiments can be woven into a U.S. policy that respects the policy of family reunification while requiring participation by the immigrant prior to the citizenship stage.

For example, the Dutch WI, which focuses on integration post-arrival, seems more applicable to the United States context. The WI requires that temporary residents take language and knowledge of Dutch society/values examinations in order to become permanent residents within five years of arrival. This ensures that both language acquisition and exposure to Dutch values take place and instills a sense of accomplishment in the immigrant striving for permanent residence. Furthermore, the WI, like any U.S. policy must, applies to all foreign nationals equally and therefore has no disparate impact. The U.S. already requires a language test and civics examination prior to naturalization, so such ideas are not new. However, shifting these requirements to a pre-citizenship stage would require legislative changes to the Immigration and Nationality Act.

4. Local Integration

One can only truly integrate once in the society in question. While the Dutch feel that preparation for integration begins abroad, actual integration can only happen once in the country of destination as the new arrival immerses him or herself in the day-to-day situations of his or her new life. The Dutch have foundered to some extent on the way to this realization, but have acknowledged that local integration after arrival is a key component to any comprehensive plan. One central lesson to be applied in the U.S. context is that simply mandating test passage does not result in actual integration. Though testing may be one part of a comprehensive program, the Dutch experience points towards the development of a plan in which immigrants participate at a local level in their own communities. Evidence suggests that integration is more successful when governments make education programs accessible and provide individualized integration plans (Assimilation Policies, 2006).

5. National Security Implications

Lastly, immigrant integration plays a role in national security. While Dutch integration policies might be better applied equally to all immigrants, regardless of their country of origin, Dutch policymakers realized in formulating such rigorous policies that immigrant communities can and do tend to isolate, which can lead to radicalization, and in part, their integration policies are aimed at countering this risk. Lidewijde Ongerling, the (Dutch) Deputy National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, stated:

The integration of Muslims has not been helped by the growth of Islamophobia in the Netherlands due to the many acts of jihadist violence around the world. This has led the non-Muslim population to distance itself. This, in turn, has led many Muslims to reorient themselves towards their own communities and cultural and religious backgrounds. As a result, polarization between Muslims and non-Muslims has been on the rise for the last few years, a trend that can accelerate radicalization processes. (Ongerling, 2007, p. 5)

Minister Vogelaar (of VROM) stated:

The integration of new Dutch citizens remains one of the most important issues facing society. Whoever wants to build a future in the Netherlands needs to be sufficiently acquainted with the language and society. In spite of this, there are still 500,000 Dutch citizens of non-Western origin whose command of the Dutch language is not good enough for active participation in society.” (VROM, 2008b)

The combination of isolated immigrant communities who cannot communicate with the local populace, who cannot understand them, and, may in fact, fear such communities is a dangerous one indeed. Dutch policies attempt to reduce the risk of social isolationism and radicalization by increasing social cohesion through the mandate that integration take place. It is this fundamental aim that the U.S. has just begun to consider and which must be emphasized in future U.S. immigration policymaking.

While it may have been generally believed that homegrown radicalization was really more a European problem, this assumption was recently quashed in full public view. The U.S. Senate held hearings on March 11, 2009, regarding the Somali youths who disappeared from the Twin Cities, and who were radicalized and recruited in the United States, and then traveled to Somalia to fight for the terrorist organization, Al-Shabaab, a group with ties to Al Qaida (Senate Press Release, 2009). The Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Joseph Lieberman, stated:

This is an unsettling story of young Somali American men being radicalized and recruited in Minneapolis and sent to Somalia for training in terrorism that will be carried out there or perhaps back here in the U.S....This is probably the most significant case of homegrown American terrorism that we have found yet. I look forward to the outcome of an ongoing FBI investigation to determine how these young Americans were radicalized and recruited. And we must work with the Somali American community, the Muslim American community, and American law enforcers to stop the spread of this dangerous development for our homeland security. (Senate Press Release, 2009)

Federal counter-terrorism officials told the U.S. Senate committee that the recruitment represents a potential security threat to the United States. If recruits were to

be indoctrinated abroad and later returned to America, they could “provide Al-Qaida with trained extremists inside the United States,” said Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence in the National Counterterrorism Center of the Directorate of Intelligence (Diaz, 2009). This following the October 2008 suicide bombing committed by a naturalized U.S. citizen of Somali descent in Somalia, Shirwa Ahmed, a 27-year old college student from Minneapolis (Diaz, 2009).

Attention to this situation highlights two issues. First, the U.S. are not so dissimilar to Europe in that the United States does contain isolated immigrant communities where radicalization can and does take place. Second, not having an immigrant integration strategy poses a risk to U.S. homeland security that is currently unaddressed in a comprehensive manner. While the Task Force on New Americans addressed a need for a comprehensive integration strategy, it did not do so from a national security perspective. This gap remains.

IV. CANADA CASE STUDY

A. THE CANADIAN “NEWCOMER” INTEGRATION MODEL

The mandate of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) involves the development and delivery of Canada’s citizenship and immigration programs (Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC], n.d.a). The responsibilities of CIC include the settlement and integration of immigrants and refugees (CIC, n.d.a). Immigrant integration is an issue of national importance to which the Canadians have devoted much thought, effort, and money, primarily towards promoting further immigration and overall social cohesion:

Canada...favors integration, which encourages a process of mutual adjustment by both newcomers and society. Newcomers are expected to understand and respect basic Canadian values, and Canadians are expected to understand and respect the cultural differences newcomers bring to Canada. Rather than expecting newcomers to abandon their own cultural heritage, the emphasis is on finding ways to integrate differences in a pluralistic society.

Integration is a gradual process that requires an active commitment from both newcomers and the receiving society. Much depends on the individual’s own motivation and aspirations but integration is a two-way process that requires accommodations and adjustments on both sides. The ability of immigrants to contribute to Canada depends not only on the personal characteristics, knowledge, skills, experience, and traditions that they bring with them, but also on the social and economic conditions they encounter upon arrival. Many newcomers require assistance in adapting to a new and changing environment. Our collective ability to provide them with essential settlement and integration services will have an impact on our ability to sustain immigration through our absorptive capacity. (CIC Integration Branch, 2001, p. 4)

The federal government of Canada has delivered basic settlement services to newcomers to Canada since the 1970s (Integration Branch, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2001, p. 4). Over the past four decades, Canada has honed its integration program and codified several components of their national integration policies into law.

B. CURRENT CANADIAN LAW AND POLICIES GOVERNING INTEGRATION

Recognition that Canada is composed of diverse peoples, all of whom can co-exist while respecting each other's differences is a concept rooted in decades of policy and law. Harles notes:

As an integrative strategy, 'official multiculturalism' emerged out of a concern to coalesce, socially, and, politically, the ethnically diverse population introduced into Canada as a consequence of post World War II immigration. In the wake of the Official Languages Act (1969) that affirmed the linguistic dominance of French and English in Canada's public institutions, in 1971, the Trudeau government introduced multiculturalism as a way to make immigrant-stock individuals of other than Anglo-Irish or French lineage feel that they, too, were fully part of the Canadian community. (Harles, 2008, p. 4)

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) is entrenched in Canada's Constitution and is similar to the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution. Section 27 of the Charter orders interpretation of the Charter, "in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians" (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982). In 1988, Canada became the first nation to proclaim a Multiculturalism Act, which requires federal institutions to carry out their activities in a manner that is both sensitive and responsive to the multicultural reality of Canada (CIC, n.d.b). The preamble to this act is "to preserve and enhance the multicultural heritage of Canadians while working to achieve the equality of all Canadians in the economic, social, cultural, and political life of Canada" (Canadian Multiculturalism Act, 1988).

Although Canada has followed a multicultural policy since 1971, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act formalized the commitment to this policy in legislation (Biles, 2008, p. 140). The current Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, the Honourable Jason Kenney, recently reaffirmed Canada's commitment to this policy, stating:

This past year (2008) saw the 20th anniversary of the *Multiculturalism Act*. Since 1988, Canada has strived to make multiculturalism a success

and recognize it as ‘a fundamental characteristic of Canadian heritage and identity.’ Since Confederation, more than 15 million immigrants have arrived in Canada and our multicultural model of unity-in-diversity, which gives our country such strength, has taken shape.” (CIC, 2009)

Given this commitment to multiculturalism, it is not surprising that immigrant integration and diversity are national priorities.

The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001) specifically includes in its objectives an integration component “to promote the successful integration of permanent residents into Canada, while recognizing that integration involves mutual obligations for new immigrants and Canadian society” (Biles, 2008, p. 140). In Canada, integration is a shared responsibility. This responsibility is shared not only by new immigrants and Canadian society as a whole, but also by a variety of private and public partners who contribute to the administration and implementation of a comprehensive immigrant integration program.

According to Biles, “Contrary to many other immigrant-receiving nations, Canada provides the majority of services provided to newcomers through third-parties, whether immigrant service provider organizations, multicultural/ethno-specific organizations, issue-based organizations, educational institutions, or partners in the private sector” (Biles, 2008, p. 141). Although the federal government establishes integration policies, it works with numerous public and private organizations across multiple disciplines to deliver the services necessary to facilitate integration. Canada’s government explains, “CIC does not provide services directly to newcomers. Through its network of local offices, CIC signs contribution agreements with, and provides funds to, immigrant-serving organizations and other community-based agencies who deliver services” (Integration-Net, n.d.c). CIC has more than 400 federal contribution agreements with more than 300 service delivery organizations and practitioners in the immigrant and refugee settlement sector (CIC Integration Branch, 2001, p. 16). It also partners with thousands of community-based volunteers to deliver both private sponsorship and settlement programs and services (CIC Integration Branch, 2001, p. 16). “In fact, the success of the Canadian approach to integration can be attributed to a large extent to the

extensive network of local service delivery partners” (CIC Integration Branch, 2001, p. 16). This arrangement ensures that integration is not simply a federal responsibility but a responsibility borne by all Canadians, whether engaged in the government, private, non-profit, or volunteer sectors.

Additionally, immigration is not simply a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction, as it is in the United States. The Canadian government explains, “Immigration is a responsibility shared by the provinces and the federal government. The *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* permits the Citizenship and Immigration Minister to enter into agreements with the provinces to provide immigration-related programming” (Integration-Net, n.d.c). As a result, CIC’s ability to share jurisdiction over immigration with provincial governments offers the federal government the flexibility to promote integration by placing some responsibility on provincial governments. At the same time, it allows the government the ability to leverage the services of other public, private, and non-profit entities who are in the best position to serve local communities. Duncan states:

In Canada, the work on the streets of our communities tends to be performed by non-governmental actors. Canadian government programs often work by offering funding ‘grants and contributions’ to non-governmental organizations who submit proposals for local activities to promote social integration, to settle immigrants, help them find housing, work, and schools for their children. The best ideas, in principle, receive the funds. This approach transfers ownership of the social integration effort to the people and their communities, and this transfer of ownership creates more social capital than were government to retain exclusive responsibility. Grants and contributions are an effective instrument for creating social capital within communities. Herein, too, lies a major benefit of framework legislation. Ideas for promoting social inclusion are developed in greater number, are targeted to the particular situation of a community, and are deployed by people with a vested interest in the outcome. Frequently the government programs require that the organizations work in partnership with others, including the business community, and this very requirement will stimulate greater trust, greater social inclusion, greater social capital. (Duncan, 2005)

Canada’s integration programs are federally funded but locally tailored. While the major settlement services are available throughout Canada, some localities may have

specialized programs that others do not, depending on the needs of the local community and the population therein. For example, the Rexdale Women's Centre in Toronto received federal funding specifically targeted towards helping newcomer women (CIC News Release, 2008).

CIC News reported, "Settlement services are an essential part of the federal government's immigration program" (CIC News Release, 2008). The Canadian model of settlement and integration aims to assist new immigrants settle in, learn an official language, find work, and become fully integrated members of society "as quickly and comfortably as possible" (Integration Branch, 2001, p. 7). To this end, the settlement process begins prior to arrival in Canada. The Canadian Orientation Abroad (COA) program, in place since 1998, is available to anyone going to Canada in the permanent resident category (CIC, n.d.c). These orientation seminars are one, two, or three days, depending on upon the immigrant class of admission, but all offer an introduction to Canada, information on settling in, employment, rights and responsibilities, climate, housing, education, cost of living, and multiculturalism (Biles, 2008, p. 144). There is another program focused solely on employment immigrants. The Canadian Immigration Integration Project (CIIP) for Pre-Arrival Preparation is aimed at immigrants going to Canada as skilled workers and provides them the opportunity to learn about Canadian labor market trends, skills in demand, career bridging programs, and licensing procedures (Association of Canadian Community Colleges, n.d.). According to Campbell Cohen, "CIIP reduces the number of immigrants who arrive unprepared for immediate entry into the Canadian workforce" (Campbell Cohen, n.d.). Both programs are voluntary and free.

In-country settlement begins the moment the immigrant lands on Canadian soil. The Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP) kicks in upon arrival at the land or airport when the immigrant is greeted and provided with a "Welcome to Canada" kit, which includes information on settling and contact information for vital services (Integration-Net, n.d.b). ISAP also includes a referral service in which the new immigrant is referred and even accompanied, if needed, to resources relating to health, cultural, recreational, and educational opportunities in the community (Integration-Net, n.d.b). Newcomers are further given a local orientation, an "introduction to the local

community to provide newcomers with a sense of belonging to the new community, and information regarding their rights and obligations” (Integration-Net, n.d.b). Interpreters can be provided to assist immigrants in accessing services while the immigrant learns English or French, and translations services are available for important legal, health-related, educational, or employment documents (Integration-Net, n.d.b). In 2007, Canada established the Foreign Credentials Referral Office (FCRO), a part of CIC, which refers immigrants to one of the five assessment agencies in Canada that can assess credentials and determine whether or not an individual requires further training or licensing prior to practicing his or her profession (CIC, n.d.d). This service is invaluable, as often the applicability of foreign education and experience is perplexing and frustrating, and non-governmental bodies who hold themselves out as assessors of such credentials are themselves not accredited by any government or professional licensing board. Here, although there is a cost to the alien, he or she can be assured that the final assessment is in alignment with government standards.

Additionally, CIC harnesses the power of volunteers through the Host program. The Host program matches local individuals or groups of individuals with new immigrants on a purely voluntary basis. The Canadian government explains:

Host is designed to help newcomers overcome the stress of moving to a new country by having a friend familiar with Canadian ways help them; practise their language skills; develop contacts in their employment field; and participate in community activities. In return, Host volunteers acquire new friends, learn about other cultures and strengthen community life. (Integration-Net, n.d.b)

The Host program, organized on a local level, addresses the vulnerability that every immigrant must feel when landing on a new shore and closes that gap by offering a very basic solution, a friend/guide. One local branch, located in Thunder Bay, Ontario, notes, “During the first months in a new country, Newcomers sometimes feel isolated and lonely. Our Host Program Coordinator can help you by introducing you to a Volunteer—someone who lives in Thunder Bay and can help you with the stress of adjusting to a new community” (Thunder Bay Multicultural Association, n.d.).

Imagine a federally-funded, local administered, volunteer based friendship program as an anti-radicalization measure. Not only does Host provide stability for a new immigrant at the beginning of a new phase in his or her life but also provides local Canadians with the opportunity to learn about new cultures, languages, and traditions from newcomers. This plays well into the multicultural commitment, which is a well-established part of Canadian culture. Additionally, from a security perspective, the fact that Host allows locals to interact with newcomers may assist in minimizing the natural suspicion that often arises when immigrants move into new communities, or conversely, could assist in calling attention to those in the beginning stages of radicalization. Community engagement is a vital component of Canada's integration strategy.

Lastly, language acquisition is viewed as key to integrating newcomers. The bulk of the government resettlement services, an entire 80 percent of total funds, are devoted to language training (Lynch & Simon, 2003, p. 68). The Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC) Program provides up to three years of *free* basic language training in one of Canada's official languages, French or English. Language ability is assessed through the Canadian Language Benchmarks Assessment to determine level of competency so that the immigrant can be referred to language training appropriate to their needs and abilities (Integration-Net, n.d.b). The government notes, "Every effort is made to ensure newcomers' ease of participation by offering LINC classes right in the communities on a full-time or part-time basis, daytime or evening...child-minding services can be provided, and transportation costs covered...." (Integration-Net, n.d.b). The LINC Program, in place since 1982, provides funding to service provider organizations that actually deliver the language training after proving that they meet certain guidelines established by the Program (Biles, 2008, p. 142). LINC provides about \$80 million annually for language instruction to immigrants and is available, not only to permanent residents, but to anyone who intends to become a permanent resident (Lynch & Simon, 2003, p. 69). Canada places a priority on language acquisition without actually requiring it prior to naturalization. Not only is it free, but the government bends over backwards to make sure that everyone can participate, even to the extent that it will

provide babysitting services so that an immigrant parent can attend classes. Such dedication speaks volumes to prospective immigrants.

LINC also provides benefits apart from language acquisition: “Interestingly, in addition to language skills, participants in LINC report that the program also helps them to learn basic details about Canada and Canadian civics; and some organizations report that they feel participants are more prepared to interact in a culturally diverse environment because of LINC’s multicultural classrooms” (Biles, 2008, p. 142). Participation in LINC, like all ISAP programs, is voluntary. Biles, a leading voice on Canadian immigration and integration, sums up the current reality well, “Immigration is theoretically a societal choice. Multiculturalism is a demographic reality” (Biles, 2009). Nineteen point three percent, of the Canadian population is foreign-born, significantly more than the U.S. immigrant population, which is twelve point five percent (Harles, 2009). Thus it appears that regardless of stated policies, these numbers reflect that Canada is truly a multicultural nation (Harles, 2009, p. 2). As Biles notes, “Canada is ethnically, religiously, linguistically and racially diverse, and would continue to become ever more even if immigration ended tomorrow” (Biles, 2009). It appears that language classes provide a cascade of benefits and serve not only to assist in day-to-day communication but also to introduce a newcomer to his or her own community as well as the resources available therein.

C. CRITIQUE AND ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN INTEGRATION PROGRAMS

In Canada, the official policy of multiculturalism and the resulting integration programs discussed above are symbiotic. Bisset explains, “Immigration has been accepted as being essential for nation-building and for strengthening two recently created pillars of the new Canadian society: diversity and multiculturalism. For many Canadians, immigration has acquired an almost mythical status” (2008). Multiculturalism is a national policy, codified in law, and implemented through the broad array of integration initiatives described above. There is no discernible critique of the Canadian newcomer integration programs in the literature. It is Canada’s policy of official multiculturalism

that garners what criticism does exist, although the criticism appears to be largely internal and voiced by a few prolific critics. Internationally, Canada's official commitment to multiculturalism is a model emulated by other countries, such as Australia (Harles, 2004).

Criticism of the Canadian multicultural/integration policies focuses primarily on the argument that multiculturalism dilutes nationalism and is, in practice, ineffective. As much as support for a multiculturalist society appears to be part of the Canadian identity, critics suggest that emphasizing differences and encouraging immigrants to hold on to their own cultures breeds divisiveness and promotes stereotyping. In his article, *Identity Crisis*, Gregg (2006) notes, "drawing attention to difference can undermine attempts to forge an overarching national identity."

Another vocal critic, Stoffman, is careful to draw lines between diversity and multiculturalism; he supports the first but not necessarily the second:

Canada is diverse, but not multicultural. The crucial difference is that multiculturalism is divisive and diversity is not...because different cultures have irreconcilable values...[and] because Canada is built not around an ethnicity or a religion but rather around a shared belief in the values of democracy and individual freedom. But if a belief in democracy unites us, and freedom of speech is essential to democracy, what happens when a powerful minority group refuses to accept the basic value? Doesn't that refusal threaten the cohesion of Canadian society? (Stoffman, 2002)

The arguments of these critics appear to have little merit if the "overarching national identity" adopted by Canadians is an official commitment to multiculturalism. Biles states, "Canadian identity is often said to include bilingualism and multiculturalism" (Biles, 2009). Stoffman's hypothetical of a rogue minority group which 'does not accept "basic values," which are undefined, smacks of speculation and fear without basis in fact.

As evidence that multiculturalism is not effective, an oft-cited proof is the fact that ethnic enclaves still exist, which critics contend would not occur if integration was truly successful. Gregg notes:

In Canada, we may live in a multicultural society, but the evidence suggests that fewer and fewer of us are living in multicultural neighbourhoods. Furthermore, the tradition of immigrants clustering in a

community for one generation before the next generation moves on and “melts” into mainstream culture seems to be breaking down. Large districts are evolving into areas dominated by individual ethnic groups that have chosen to live apart from those who do not share their ancestry. This growing sense of separateness can have troubling consequences for national identity. The absence of interaction between groups of different backgrounds invariably perpetuates cultural divisions, breeds ignorance, and leads to stereotyping and prejudice. (Gregg, 2006)

Harles explained:

The Canadian government reports that ethnic enclaves among visible minorities, communities in which at least 30% of the population is from a single group, are on the rise. In 1981 only six such communities existed; in 2001, there were more than two hundred and fifty. But in Canada, an official commitment to a multicultural society does not necessarily equate to multicultural neighborhoods. (Harles, 2009, p. 16)

Today, nearly 80 percent of the immigrant population gravitates towards Toronto, Montreal, or Vancouver, and within these ethnic centers, immigrant groups are:

...clustering in tightly knit, ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods partly because, according to the government’s own studies, many ethnic groups feel out of place in Canada. Their first loyalty is to their group, and, against a history of the children of immigrants ‘moving out,’ today there is an increasing concentration of visible-minority groups ‘staying home,’ staying alien to host cultures and having little sense of civic nationalism. (Gregg, 2006)

The government, however, views “ethnic enclaves” in a very different light:

Ethnic enclaves can play a positive role in easing the shock of adjustment to a new culture...To the degree that ethnic enclaves restrict their members and shield them from alternative norms, values and behaviours, they can discourage immigrants from full participation in society and perpetuate segregation...Ideally, in an integrated society, immigrants move through the ethnic enclave, using its resources to enter mainstream society. In this view, ethnic enclaves consist of individuals linked by common interests in removing barriers against their participation in the broader community. Ethnic groups may continue to exist, but individuals might fall away as they adjust to the host society. (Employment and Immigration Canada, 1993, pp. 4–5)

What is not evident from either point of view is that so-called “ethnic enclaves” directly contradict the goals of multiculturalism. It is not realistic, in any country, to expect like individuals not to live near one another, especially if they are related, share common languages, foods, and traditions. It would seem that ethnic enclaves can only be seen in a negative light. The proof of the failure of a multiculturalist policy, when those who live within them feel unwelcome outside of them, and those outside them feel unwelcome to venture in. Does the existence of Toronto’s famous Chinatown signal a failure of multiculturalism?

Yet, for every critic’s claim of failure, there appears to be a boisterous refute:

Citizenship acquisition in Canada among the foreign-born is considerably higher than either the United States or France, though in all three countries the number of naturalizations has grown appreciably over the last decade. If multiculturalism signifies an institutional commitment by the Canadian government to promote citizenship among culturally diverse foreign-born residents, on this score it may be working. By 2006, approximately 85% of foreign-born residents eligible for Canadian citizenship possessed it as opposed to 52% in the U.S. Immigrants to Canada also achieve citizenship more quickly than they do in the U.S. and France. (Harles, 2008)

Since the acquisition of citizenship is not required and requires considerable effort to achieve, these statistics paint a picture of immigrants who are self-motivated to become Canadian. Could this perhaps be fueled in part by the policy of multiculturalism? Are immigrants more comfortable knowing that becoming a Canadian national does not mean erasing native culture, given that “the policy of official multiculturalism affirms and legitimates ethnic distinctions” (Harles, 2008)? It is certainly a possibility, especially since, unlike the United States, Canada allows dual nationality (CIC, n.d.e).

Does Canada’s policy of multiculturalism, and its attendant integration program, actually work to effect a diverse cohesive society? Among social scientists, national integration is often approximated by measuring immigration participation in the central institutions of the host country (Harles, 2008, p. 12). Statistics can be gathered on ethnic enclaves, rates of naturalization, language acquisition, voting, and employment. However:

...a more profound mark of a well-integrated polity is the strong sense of belonging felt by its members. *Deep conceptions of personal identity are at issue.* A fundamental integrative question about immigrants, then, is whether the newcomers' understanding of themselves—their idea of “us”—includes the host society. (Kymlicka, 1999)

In a 2001 study of “psychological integration,” entitled *Focus Canada*, most say they have assumed a Canadian identity and are very or somewhat proud to be Canadian (Harles, 2008). Regardless of the debate, which seems to be purely academic in nature, there does not appear to be evidence, empirical or otherwise, to indicate that Canada's policy of multiculturalism or its integration programs are not effective. As Biles notes, “both proponents and opponents are firmly entrenched in thier beliefs” (2009).

D. POLITICAL CONTEXT

The debate about multiculturalism and integration in Canada, unlike that in the Netherlands, is still more about social cohesion and less about national security. Canada's policymakers certainly have evidenced an intent to make newcomers feel welcome, but this is less out of a concern for radicalization, and perhaps more because they desire to bring in more immigrants. Canada needs people. For example, the city of Peterborough in 2008 formed a new council on immigration, realizing that without attracting new Canadians, the area will not be able to flourish (Canadian Immigration News, 2008). Mike Ma, co-ordinator of the Community and Race Relations Committee, said, “Economic prosperity is tied to population growth and we can't have population growth without immigration. So we need a strategy to increase immigration, and we need a resettlement strategy for comprehensive integration and retention” (Canadian Immigration News, 2008). The fact that Canada proactively seeks to attract an immigrant influx with its integration programs is a stark contrast to the Dutch program which appears in many ways to be constructed to vet out immigration from undesirable countries. However, Canada has not had the same experience with domestic terrorism as the Dutch, and thus, the level of debate is relatively low, and speculative. James Bissett, former head of the immigration service, states:

For the past 17 years, Canada has received approximately 250,000 immigrants each year. Many thousands of these newcomers have come from Muslim countries whose populations are known to contain significant numbers of Islamist radicals. It would be foolish to suggest that the majority of these immigrants or their families represent a security threat, but it would be equally wrong to assume that there are no potential radicals among them, who would be willing to support or engage in terrorist activities. The experience of other countries that receive a high volume of Muslim immigrants has shown that some of these migrants or their children—even those born in the new country—are susceptible to the radical Islamist cause. Although, so far, Canada has been fortunate enough not to have experienced an Islamist terrorist strike, our security service has warned us that it may only be a question of time before that occurs. (2008, p. 81)

Bissett notes that in 2006, 18 Canadian-born Muslims were arrested and charged with planning a series of terrorist attacks against selected targets and calls for Canada to review its immigration policy in relation to the admission of immigrants from Muslim countries “that are known to produce terrorists” (2008, p. 81). Citing this incident as evidence that Canada needs to review its immigration policy is nonsensical, since Canadian-born Muslims are by definition not immigrants. Bissett further states:

...none of Canada’s political parties are willing to admit that our immigration and refugee policies are in any way a security concern. However, in Canada, there is little attempt to screen prospective immigrants from terrorist producing countries. Considering the state of Canada’s policies, it would appear that the prospect of dealing with the threat of Muslim terrorism in Canada is pretty grim. (2008, p. 91)

While it is possible that Canada needs to review its immigration programs in light of national security concerns, Bissett’s arguments seem to conflate Muslims, immigrants, and terrorists. National security concerns are not the lens through which Canada views immigration and integration, although the Integration Branch does view settlement programs and services as a “counterpoint to enforcement” (Integration Branch, 2001, p. 7).

E. LESSONS LEARNED

1. Engage Stakeholders

Canada harnesses the expertise and resources of businesses, non-profits, community groups, educational institutions, volunteers, provincial and local governments, and NGOs in order to facilitate and deliver all components of its integration programs.

This comprehensive array of programs backed by a wide variety of stakeholders, allows the Canadian federal government to play “a somewhat background role of creating conditions within which the rest of society and its institutions can flourish. This set of initiatives with their attendant policies, laws and regulations, comprises a framework within which immigrants enter Canada and settle. It is a mix of measures to provide incentives, to promote certain behaviours and attitudes, and to provide the force of law where this is appropriate and necessary. *To a large extent it is a frame work within which people in Canada integrate themselves* [emphasis added]. (Duncan, 2005).

Allowing groups who wish to deliver services to compete encourages competition. In theory, the best able to deliver the services receives the funds to do so from the government. This free-market style competition “creates more social capital than if the government were to retain exclusive responsibility...this approach transfers ownership of the social integration effort to the people and their communities” (Duncan, 2005, p. 5). The government will not always be the best situated to deliver all the services necessary to a successful integration program and the Canadians have found an efficient and successful market driven alternative.

2. Integration Happens at the Local Level

As the Dutch have more recently discovered, integration actually occurs in local communities, and that may be the key to the apparent success of the Canadian program. One key component that allows this to happen is the multijurisdictional nature of the Canadian immigration system. Section 95 of the Constitution Act of 1867 assigns concurrent legislative authority over immigration to the federal and provincial orders of

the government, while policy is based on the premise that the federal, provincial, and territorial governments have a shared responsibility to manage immigration in the public interest (Integration Branch, 2001, p. 16). The current settlement programs are “born out of the realization that settlement programming would appropriately belong with provincial/territorial governments, as they are in the best position to identify local needs and already hold responsibility for related areas of social policy such as health, social services and education” (Integration Branch, 2001, p. 16). This realization allows for flexibility, such that programs can be tailored to the particular needs of the local immigrant populace. Canada’s Integration Branch has learned that “Newcomers settle in communities, and decisions on precisely what settlement services are required are, therefore, made at the community level” (Integration Branch, 2001, p. 15). With only federal oversight and implementation, an integration strategy may run the risk of a one-size-fits-all program, which could not, in fact, fit all, since different immigrant populations will have different needs.

3. Begin at the Beginning, and Then Follow Through

Canada’s integration programs begin abroad, prior to the intending immigrant’s arrival. The Canadian Orientation Abroad (COA) and the Canadian Immigration Integration Project (CIIP) for Pre-Arrival Preparation programs serve to introduce Canada, provide information, answer questions, alleviate fears, and provide welcome, even before the immigrant leaves his or her home country. When the newcomer lands on Canadian soil, he or she is personally greeted at the airport. Free English lessons are provided, volunteers provide local community orientation, translation services are provided, and job referral and credential evaluation services are available. The spectrum of services available:

...aims to enable newcomers to adapt, settle, and integrate into Canadian society as quickly and comfortably as possible so that they may become contributing members of Canadian society. Programs therefore encompass both pre and post-arrival settlement and orientation services abroad and in Canada. (Integration Branch, 2001, p. 7)

Unlike in the United States, immigrants to Canada do not simply receive an immigration benefit and well wishes, they receive as much continued assistance and contact as necessary to integrate them into their local communities, a process which begins pre-arrival. The Canadian program really starts at the beginning and then follows through. This elongated timeline for integration offers multiple encounters with individuals and agencies that want to assist, which, in addition to promoting social cohesion, may be an effective anti-radicalization measure.

4. Make It Easy

The Canadians make it very easy for new immigrants to take advantage of the various settlement programs and services. Moving to a new country can be difficult, expensive, and frustrating as newcomers attempt to communicate in a new language, deal with government agencies, and figure out “how things work.” Canada’s programs are free, well promoted, and volunteers, under auspices of the Host program, will personally introduce newcomers to community resources, acting as liaisons between cultures. In addition, babysitting is provided if necessary, for those who would otherwise not be able to attend language classes. In addition, Canada advertises and promotes its integration programs with positive messaging campaigns. Canada makes it easy for immigrants to access the programs designed to integrate them into society.

5. Really Mean It

The Canadians are serious about multiculturalism and integration. There is a commitment in law and policy on a national level with adequate funding to back it up. Canada has evidenced a national commitment, recognizing that achieving successful integration is a complex, ongoing, and, in some cases, a long-term process (Integration Branch, 2001, p. 6).

V. TASK FORCE ON NEW AMERICANS

While the Dutch and Canadians both have well-developed integration programs, the United States has only recently begun to study the issue. On June 7, 2006, former President George W. Bush established by Executive Order 12404 the Task Force on New Americans, with a call to “strengthen the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security and federal, state, and local agencies to help legal immigrants embrace the common core of American civic culture, learn our common language, and fully become Americans” (DHS, 2008a, p. iv). The Task Force, chaired by former Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, included representatives from other federal agencies, private sector companies, non-governmental organizations, educational institutions, ethnic based community groups, faith based organizations, think tanks, libraries, and state and local governments. Based on two years of research, the Task Force issued a final report in December 2008, which contains 10 recommendations to strengthen integration efforts. The report states, “Taken together, these recommendations build the strategic framework for a national movement to integrate immigrants...” (DHS, 2008a, p. x).

The recommendations include:

1. An Americanization Movement for the Twenty-first Century. This includes, for example, creating a “welcoming” literacy campaign to promote English language acquisition and to encourage all sectors to become more involved with naturalization ceremonies.
2. Viewing Integration as a Two-way Street. This includes a call for history and civics to be strengthened in the public school system and a public campaign targeting all to provide a deeper understanding of American identity.
3. Improved Legislation on Integration and Citizenship. This includes the creation of State Integration Councils.
4. Federal Celebration of Citizenship. This calls for high-level government officials to use their positions of leadership to promote integration and for the creation of a presidential medal to be awarded annually to naturalized citizens who have made outstanding contributions to the U.S.

5. Federal Leadership on Integration. This calls for federal agencies to prioritize incorporating integration messages into existing programs, for U.S. embassies and consulates to provide information on English and civics to immigrants pre-arrival, and for civics education for refugees.
6. Enhanced E-learning Tools for Adults. Calls for a Web portal for E-learning English, history, and government.
7. Encouraging the Private Sector to Promote Integration. Calls for businesses to consider civics, citizenship and English classes as part of workforce development.
8. Mobilizing the Volunteer Community. Calls for the creation of a nationally accredited short training program for volunteers to teach English and citizenship and encourages companies to offer their employees paid time to serve in this capacity.
9. Increasing Integration Stakeholders. Encourages foundations, philanthropies, civic organizations, and civics clubs to make immigrant integration a priority.
10. Broadened Analysis and Evaluation of Integration. Calls for think tanks and academic institutions to study integration. (DHS, 2008a)

This two-year project is the most serious consideration, at the federal level, of the integration issue in this century. However, very few of these recommendations have been implemented. The most tangible result is the Web site www.welcometousa.gov. Launched in June 2007, it consolidates information in the form of Internet links to resources that may assist new immigrants in the process of integration. A user can download study materials for the naturalization test, a guide for new legal permanent residents entitled *Welcome to the United States*, and link to information on a variety of useful topics such as government benefits, health, safety, childcare, and finance.

USCIS has also partnered with the National Park Service in order to hold some naturalization ceremonies in spectacular settings, such as Ellis Island and the National Mall. Additionally, the Office of Citizenship created a Civics and Citizenship Toolkit, that includes educational tools, such as civics flashcards; it has proven very popular with those studying for naturalization tests.

Unfortunately, even these few steps forward do not appear to be enough to address the need for a truly comprehensive integration program that assists new immigrants and citizens with the transition process after the tests are passed and the oaths of citizenship sworn. The Web site is neither publicized nor promoted. Immigrants cannot utilize tools of which they are not aware. And although some lucky residents are randomly selected to participate in naturalization ceremonies in stunning settings presided over by high-level government officials, most take the oath in mundane settings such as USCIS buildings, stadiums, and rented auditoriums. Furthermore, although the Civics and Citizenship Toolkit is valuable for those studying for naturalization tests, integration, which includes education, must begin before the naturalization stage because naturalization is not mandatory. Of all of the Task Force recommendations, only these few efforts resulted. The Task Force apparently disbanded upon delivering their recommendations to the former President, and there is no evidence that their remaining recommendations will be implemented or that further study of this issue continues.

Additionally, there is no evidence that the Task Force, in their research or formulation of recommendations, studied the programs of other countries or considered the national security benefits of a more cohesive society. The Task Force, had it done so, might have suggested more substantive changes. Furthermore, if the link had been made to anti-radicalization and national security, the issue of integration might not have been dropped after recommendations were formulated and delivered.

Although not linked to the Task Force, a new development in integration policy was announced by USCIS Director Alejandro Mayorkas on February 25, 2010. For the first time, two competitive grants are available which are “designed to help prepare lawful permanent residents (LPRs) for citizenship and advance integration in the United States” (USCIS, 2010). Although not yet awarded, and not promoted as a national security benefit, this new funding is a significant step towards promoting immigrant integration in the United States and if successful, may benefit national security efforts.

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VI. SYNTHESIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States is decades behind many other countries in its immigrant integration efforts. While successful integration may reap social benefits, it is the connection to the national security effort that has been underemphasized. Certainly, due in large part to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the inclusion of the former components of the INS into the Department of Homeland Security, and the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report, security background checks on intending immigrants, and others seeking immigration benefits have become more stringent. However thorough, this scrutiny does not account for domestic radicalization. It is not only conceivable, but also factual, that immigrants who have no previous experience with extremist groups may radicalize in the United States. No amount of pre-benefit checks can alert USCIS that an alien with a pristine background will radicalize in the future. USCIS does not follow or track aliens once they have received immigration benefits. No further security checks are run post-benefit unless an alien, for example, a legal permanent resident, applies for an additional benefit, such as naturalization. It is arguable that the risk that radicalization may occur unnoticed then, is substantially higher in the United States than in other countries that seek to integrate new populations over a period of time and offer post-benefit contact with various government and community organizations. While former President Bush and the Task Force for New Americans recognized a need to address immigrant integration in the United States, it is the lack of connecting this need to national security efforts that leaves a major gap in the overall strategy to secure the homeland.

The chart below (Figure 1) provides a reminder of how large a gap actually exists. It illustrates the 19 thwarted terror attacks that have been attempted against U.S. targets since September 11, 2001. Of these plots, three were planned exclusively by native-born U.S. citizens and four exclusively by foreign nationals. The majority, 12 plots, were planned by immigrants or groups including immigrants, some of whom had gone as far through the U.S. immigration system as to naturalize as citizens.




Figure 1. Thwarted Terror Plots Since September 11, 2001(The Heritage Foundation, 2007)

These shocking statistics should cause policymakers to pause and consider why these attacks occurred in the first place. Radicalization occurred within the United States. The literature reviewed highlights a link between the search for an identity and a path to radicalization, a path that may be halted prior to violent action if proper intervention were to occur. Identity in this context may be viewed from two different perspectives: the identity of the individual who seeks to belong to something greater than himself; and the more encompassing identity of a people who belong to a nation and identify as Americans. See Figure 2.




Figure 2. Successful Integration

In a successful integration model, as seen above, these concepts are not mutually exclusive, but rather overlap, providing an environment of inclusiveness that benefits both the individual and society as a whole.

In formulating an integration program for the United States, it would be beneficial to study the models of other countries and to learn from their experiences. There is no need to reinvent the wheel. Many countries have decades of experience with immigrant integration programs and continue to refine them as they learn from their failures and successes.

The Netherlands and Canada offer two very different models from which to draw conclusions. While neither program perfectly suits the needs of the United States, there is value in dissecting their approach to integration and adapting parts of both programs for inclusion in a U.S. program. As Duncan notes, “Universal integration methods are unrealistic; all societies have their particularities that must and will affect how integration can take place. But it is equally unrealistic to think that nothing is transferable from one society to another” (Duncan, 2005, p. 2).

Study of the Dutch strategy reveals a program based on numerous requirements while the Canadian multiculturalist approach is based on numerous invitations to participate in one's own integrative process. According to Duncan, "When integration is seen as a policy device to further independent ends, it may be presented either as an offer to the immigrant or a requirement, perhaps a requirement so strong that its non-fulfillment may result in penalties including deportation" (Duncan, 2005, p. 4). While the Dutch program is presented as a requirement, the Canadian program is presented as an offer to immigrants. The study of two diametrically opposed approaches offers a wealth of observations and lessons that may be considered by U.S. policymakers. It is unnecessary to come to judgment on which program, the Dutch or Canadian, is more successful. To be certain, "cross-national assessments are delicate" (Harles, 2009, p. 13). The following recommendations benefit from a synthesis of both failures and successes experienced by both countries as they have evolved their integrative policies over the past few decades:

A. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THE DUTCH EXPERIENCE

1. The United States should develop an immigrant integration strategy that places the burden to integrate on all immigrant populations equally. Laws with disparate impact, even if not written in an overtly discriminatory manner, can cause further segregation between immigrants and host societies.
2. The United States should consider requiring English language acquisition prior to the citizenship stage, perhaps linking such requirements to permanent residence. Studies indicate that English language acquisition has a direct impact on economic success. This also serves to place the responsibility on the immigrant instead of the state, shifting residence from an entitlement to a benefit that is earned.
3. The United States should consider that testing alone does not ensure actual integration and that real integration happens in local communities. To this end, any program should entail the participation of the immigrant in his or her own chosen community as well as the community's investment in the immigrant. This could include English classes or job assistance in exchange for community service.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

1. The United States should engage a wide variety of stakeholders in the integration process, as practiced by Canada and envisioned by the Task Force for New Americans. Both Canada and the Task Force view this goal as a national effort. The U.S. government does not need to cede federal power over immigration to other entities in order to involve them in an overall strategy. The Task Force itself might serve as a valuable model as to the types of entities that should be included in a U.S. program. Furthermore, Canada's programs appear to be of such high quality because they encourage competition among those entities who wish to deliver settlement services, therefore ensuring that the best providers receive the funds.
2. The U.S. program should consider, in formulating its program, a long-term approach that seeks to provide services and availability from prior to arrival to citizenship and beyond. This approach is an anti-radicalization measure. If there is opportunity for contact and participation at many points along the timeline of acclimation, there is a greater chance that radicalization may be halted prior to violent action and a greater chance that someone progressing along the path would be noticed by others. Integration must be viewed as a long-term process.
3. The U.S. must be serious about immigrant integration, dedicating not only substantial funding towards integration programs, but creating legislation as well. Canada's inclusion of its multiculturalist policies into national laws symbolizes, not only to immigrants, but to native Canadians as well, a commitment to an overall social framework shared by all who live there. The failure of the Task Force on New Americans to function beyond the end of the Bush administration and the low level of implantation of its recommendations sends a signal to immigrants and American society that this issue is not yet important in this country.

These recommendations represent a synthesis of both the Dutch and Canadian experiences. None is radical, but all are crafted to promote social cohesion with a realistic eye towards actual implementation. The United States is unique in composition, and its integration program should reflect this heritage. As a "nation of immigrants," Americans have become accustomed to encountering those from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The attacks of September 11, 2001 caused the U.S. government to review its immigration policies, its people to reconsider their view of immigrants, and for society to question what it means to be American.

The following essay, entitled “What Is An American?” and published two weeks after the attacks, sums up nicely how Americans view themselves:

You probably missed it in the rush of news last week, but there was actually a report that someone in Pakistan had published in a newspaper there an offer of a reward to anyone who killed an American, any American.

So I just thought I would write to let them know what an American is, so they would know when they found one.

An American is English...or French, or Italian, Irish, German, Spanish, Polish, Russian or Greek. An American may also be African, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Australian, Iranian, Asian, or Arab, or Pakistani, or Afghan.

An American is Christian, or he could be Jewish, or Buddhist, or Muslim. In fact, there are more Muslims in America than in Afghanistan. The only difference is that in America they are free to worship as each of them choose.

An American is also free to believe in no religion. For that he will answer only to God, not to the government, or to armed thugs claiming to speak for the government and for God.

An American is from the most prosperous land in the history of the world. The root of that prosperity can be found in the Declaration of Independence, which recognizes the God-given right of each man and woman to the pursuit of happiness.

An American is generous. Americans have helped out just about every other nation in the world in their time of need. When Afghanistan was overrun by the Soviet army 20 years ago, Americans came with arms and supplies to enable the people to win back their country. As of the morning of September 11, Americans had given more than any other nation to the poor in Afghanistan.

An American does not have to obey the mad ravings of ignorant, ungodly cruel, old men. American men will not be fooled into giving up their lives to kill innocent people, so that these foolish old men may hold on to power. American women are free to show their beautiful faces to the world, as each of them choose.

An American is free to criticize his government's officials when they are wrong, in his or her own opinion. Then he is free to replace them, by majority vote.

Americans welcome people from all lands, all cultures, all religions, because they are not afraid. They are not afraid that their history, their religion, their beliefs, will be overrun, or forgotten. That is because they know they are free to hold to their religion, their beliefs, their history, as each of them choose.

And just as Americans welcome all, they enjoy the best that everyone has to bring, from all over the world. The best science, the best technology, the best products, the best books, the best music, the best food, the best athletes.

Americans welcome the best, but they also welcome the least. The national symbol of America welcomes your tired and your poor, the wretched refuse of your teeming shores, the homeless, tempest tossed.

These in fact are the people who built America. Many of them were working in the twin towers on the morning of September 11, earning a better life for their families.

So you can try to kill an American if you must. Hitler did. So did General Tojo and Stalin and Mao Tse-Tung, and every bloodthirsty tyrant in the history of the world.

But in doing so you would just be killing yourself. Because Americans are not a particular people from a particular place. They are the embodiment of the human spirit of freedom. Everyone who holds to that spirit, everywhere, is an American.

So look around you. You may find more Americans in your land than you thought were there. One day they will rise up and overthrow the old, ignorant, tired tyrants that trouble too many lands. Then those lands too will join the community of free and prosperous nations.

And America will welcome them. (Ferrera, 2001)

As the immigration debate rages under the new administration of President Obama, it is important to remember this sentiment. Former President Bush, in his 2001 inaugural address, stated:

America has never been united by blood or birth or soil. We are bound by ideals that move us beyond our backgrounds, lift us above our interests and teach us what it means to be citizens. Every child must be taught these principles. Every citizen must uphold them. And every immigrant, by embracing these ideals, makes our country more, not less, American. (Bush, 2001)

It is this level of commitment that must be behind any U.S. integration effort. A feeling of welcome and belonging promotes U.S. national security. Despite what appear to be obvious links between immigrants, identity, radicalization, and deficient integration efforts, the United States does not seem to be moving forward proactively to address this issue. However, the grant program announced by USCIS Director Alejandro Mayorkas on February 25, 2010 has the potential to provide the first steps towards an official immigrant integration program.

Perhaps the recent investigation of Somali-American men, immigrants who naturalized, radicalized in the U.S., and then disappeared to fight in Somalia, will serve as a shocking reminder of the need to address this issue immediately before the U.S. is attacked from within. Approximately 20 young Americans, Somali refugees who had naturalized, left the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul in two waves to join al Shabaab, a militant Islamist group aligned with Al Qaeda that is fighting to overthrow the fragile Somali government (Elliott, 2009). At the root of the problem was a “crisis of belonging,” said the uncle of one of the boys and friend of another (Elliott, 2009). Although friends say the men would have never thought of carrying out attacks in the United States, FBI officials worry that with their training, ideology, and American passports, there is a real danger that they could (Elliott, 2009). The fact that the radicalization process of these young immigrant men occurred on the American street should serve as a wake-up call, not only to Congress, who has held hearings on these disappearances, but to the American people at large.

Just as the question of what it means to be American can be debated ad nauseam, so can the question of what successful integration really means. As the Canadians note, “At present, there is little consensus of a definition of integration or on an appropriate set of indicators” (Integration Branch, 2001, p. 30). A wide variety of indicators can be

considered, such as language acquisition, economic success, educational success, volunteerism, social involvement, political involvement, and a feeling of belonging. The limitation of any integration program is how to measure success. Can one measure a feeling of belonging? If a program is instituted and domestic attacks by immigrants do not occur, can the lack of attacks be attributed in any measurable way to the program itself? Perhaps, in a society that adores statistics and measurements, acknowledging that social benefits cannot always be measured will be a difficult leap of faith. Nonetheless, as a society, the U.S. must take the leap towards addressing immigrant integration together, in a meaningful and comprehensive manner, in order to assist in closing an ever-widening gap in national security efforts.

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